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Over the last 20 years, Mexico redefined the role of the state in its economy 
through an ambitious program to liberalize trade, promote efficiency and reduce 
the size and scope of the state-owned sector. In Mexico, privatization led to a 
significant improvement in firm performance, as profitability increased 24 
percentage points and converged to levels similar to those of private firms. From 
this increase, at most 5 percent can be attributed to higher prices and 31 percent to 
transfers from workers, with the remaining 64 percent representing productivity 
gains. There is evidence that privatization provides other social benefits, as 
greater access to services, which usually follows privatization, leads to welfare 
gains for the poorest consumers that outweigh any increase in prices. Moreover, 
an often-overlooked aspect of privatization is its fiscal impact, whereby the 
proceeds from the sale are augmented by reduced subsidies and increased taxes 
and can help pay off debt or finance social spending. The Mexican privatization 
program can provide a valuable guide to privatization dos and don’ts: First, the 
privatization process must be carefully designed and run in a transparent way. 
Special requirements such as bans on foreign direct investment or cash-only 
payments lead to substantial price discounts for firms sold, while simplicity 
breeds competition and leads to higher prices. A transparent program can also 
help quell the tendency of politicians to favor their friends by tweaking the rules 
of the game. Second, restructuring firms prior to privatization is 
counterproductive in raising net sale prices and should be avoided. Governments 
spend substantial resources on politically motivated investment or efficiency 
programs that are not valued by bidders and which can rarely be justified on the 
social ground on which they are sold. Additionally, restructuring programs 
lengthen the privatization process considerably and lower prices for firms sold— 
in the case of Mexico, each month of delay reduced the sale price by 2.2 percent. 
Finally, this paper argues that it is essential to carefully deregulate and re-regulate 
privatized firms to ensure that they behave appropriately as well as to provide a 
corporate governance framework to ensure firms are able to finance their 
operations without relying on the Government for help.  
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
What should privatization attempt to achieve? Why does it work? How does it affect firm 
performance? What are the determinants of privatization prices? What are the effects in terms of 
fiscal policy? How should a privatization program be structured? What role should deregulation 
or re-regulation have in a privatization policy, and why? In this paper, we provide empirical 
answers to these questions through a micro- and macro-economic analysis of the Mexican 
privatization program. The Mexican program, carried out over the past 20 years, has been one of 
the largest in the world in terms of its scale and scope. It implied the reversal of forty years of 
state interventionism and profoundly transformed the economic landscape of Mexico. 
Recently, politicians and the media have harshly questioned the effect of privatization, 
claiming that benefits are exaggerated and that privatization invariably leads to welfare losses for 
society. This paper’s key finding is that privatization leads to dramatic improvements in firm 
performance and that they are the result of efficiency gains, not transfers from workers or 
exploitation of consumers. We find that the operating-income-to-sales ratio for the median firm 
increased 24 percentage points and, by assuming that quality is unchanged and that fired workers 
have zero productivity, we estimate that price increases and transfers from workers can account 
for at most 5 and 31 percent of the increase in profitability, respectively. Similar improvements 
are observed for operating efficiency and output. Furthermore, we calculate industry-adjusted 
indicators to ensure that the results obtained are directly attributable to the transfer of control to 
the private sector and not a reflection of general macroeconomic trends or sector-specific 
phenomena.  
  Even when this initial objection is overcome, many argue that privatization should be 
opposed because benefits accrue to the new owners only, while consumers and the poor are left 
behind. It is claimed that the sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) amounts to a privatization of 
benefits while the government is left to foot the bill if things go wrong. Contrary to this belief, 
we find that there are significant social benefits to privatization, particularly from greater access 
to goods and services. It is precisely the poor who are usually left out of the telephone, electricity 
and water networks when they are public and therefore the ones who stand the most to gain from 
increased coverage. Moreover, although it is true that the government has sometimes footed the 
bill for botched privatizations, an often-overlooked aspect of privatizations is their beneficial 
fiscal effect. Lower subsidies, increased taxes, and of course direct revenues from sale provided 
  5Mexico with the revenues needed to dramatically reduce its stock of external debt and increase 
spending on education and poverty alleviation programs.  
Among those who accept that privatization is a positive force, there is a widespread belief 
that SOEs need extensive restructuring and nurturing before they are fit for sale. With this in 
mind, governments often spend vast sums of money and much valuable time implementing 
investment and efficiency plans that are not valued by bidders. For the case of Mexico, the 
presence of an efficiency restructuring program or an investment plan reduced the net 
privatization price received by the government by 56 and 95 percent, respectively. Furthermore, 
each additional month taken to complete the privatization decreased prices by 2.2 percent. This 
evidence clearly suggest that governments should think twice before engaging in these types of 
restructuring programs and that often the best solution is to simply concentrate on the sale of 
SOEs and leave the restructuring to the market. If politicians wish to help displaced workers, 
there is sure to be a more cost-effective way to do it than by trying to fix public firms before they 
are sold. An additional lesson that can be drawn from the Mexican experience is that simplicity 
and transparency are paramount to a successful program. Special requirements such as cash-only 
sales reduced net prices by 30 percent, while allowing foreigners to participate boosted prices by 
32 percent and the presence of an additional bidder in the final round increased them by 17 
percent.  
Finally, this paper attempts to make sense of cases of failed privatization by analyzing the 
importance of a set of complementary policies such as the design of the privatization contracts, 
deregulation and re-regulation of privatized firms and the corporate governance framework. We 
find that the main instances of botched privatization can be traced back to mistakes in one or 
more of these complementary policies. Although it is clear that more attention is needed in these 
areas, the good news is that the failures seen so far seem to have a readily available solution.  
 
2. Mexican SOEs and Privatization  
 
To understand the opportunities presented by the Mexican privatization program it is helpful to 
first analyze the role of the government in the economy and the motives behind this role. The 
1917 Constitution established the general jurisdictional framework under which the role of the 
State in the economy was defined. From this foundation, the Mexican government launched a 
gradual takeover of the economy and by 1982, the year in which banks were nationalized, the 
  6government controlled over 1,100 firms in all sectors of the economy, including monopolistic 
control of strategic areas such as energy and infrastructure. Since then, government ownership of 
enterprises has declined precipitously and is now significant only in some entrenched sectors 
which have successfully resisted divestiture due to their political clout, most notably oil and 
electricity. This section analyzes the rise of the SOE sector and the subsequent privatization 
program in more detail.  
 
The Growth of the SOE Sector 
 
Table 1 shows the main focus of state expansion for different periods during 1917-2003 as well 
as the number of SOEs at the end of each period. During the 1920s, government operations 
mostly reflected attempts to regulate the economy; the Central Bank was established to control 
monetary policy, and investments in infrastructure were used to stimulate the economy.
1 The 
Great Depression in the United States and the worldwide economic crises that accompanied it led 
the government to take direct responsibility for the provision of many basic services. In 1934, the  
“Cardenista” era began with the implementation of a six-year plan that emphasized the role of 
agricultural development and the provision of basic services. Predictably, this approach quickly 
spawned an array of funding institutions that would outlive their initial mandate and become 
engines for state expansion.
2 Pemex, the national oil company and probably the most prominent 
SOE in Mexican history, was created during this period and still remains in state hands today.  
    By 1940 the government owned 36 enterprises, and the stage was set for a massive 
expansion of the state-owned sector. The period from 1940 to the mid-1950s witnessed the 
State’s implementation of an import-substitution model and the undertaking of capital-intensive 
and long-maturity investments such as steel mills, coal mines, paper mills and oil refineries. The 
government also took over the social security system during this period and created two 
institutions to run it: the National Institute for Social Security (to manage private sector 
pensions) and the Social Security of Government Employees. Until 1947, each company was 
almost completely responsible for its own operations, and the whole SOE sector was managed in 
                                                 
1 For example, the National Commission of Irrigation and the National Commission of Highways and Roads were in 
charge of providing investments to rural areas and of fomenting trade by improving the infrastructure of Mexico.  
2 Among the most important firms and funding institutions created during this period are the National Commission 
of Electricity, the National Railway Company, the Exporting and Importing Mexican Company (CEIMSA), the 
National Bank of Agricultural Credit and the National Bank of Ejido Credit.  
  7a decentralized fashion. In that year, however, due to the increasing size of government 
operations, centralized control was established under two ministries.
3 
The late 1950s and 1960s were known as a period of “stable development,” during which 
the economy grew swiftly and the government expanded its influence in a seemingly random 
way. The number of SOEs more than doubled, and public ownership of firms expanded to new 
sectors, including sugar cane mills and the manufacture of textiles, tobacco, and food processing. 
The State’s major investments were directed toward regional development with the aim of 
increasing employment and production across the nation. Supervision became more complex as 
the number of SOEs increased, and in 1970 control of these firms was centralized under the 
control of three ministries: the Ministry of Finance (SHCP), the Secretariat of the Presidency 
(SP), and the Secretariat of National Patrimony (SENEPAL). 
 
Table 1. State-Owned Enterprises in Mexico, 1917-2003 
 
Main Focus of State Activity  Period  Number of SOEs 
(end of period) 
Public administration, creation of infrastructure, administration of 
natural resources and provision of basic services. 
1917-1940      36 
Import-substitution oriented investments (capital-intensive and long-
maturity areas; industry input suppliers); transportation and 
communications; and social security institutions. 
1941-1954     144 
Stable development, unplanned expansion: Regional development, 
production expansion, and creation of employment. 
1955-1970     272 
Planned expansion: oil bonanza, government as an industrial 
investment engine.  
1971-1975    504 
Planned expansion: Bank nationalization, government investment in 
strategic areas and takeover of firms in distress.  
1976-1982   1,155 
Main program of liberalization of the economy and divestiture of the 
state owned sector. 
1983-1993    258 
Consolidation of the privatization program: public utilities and 
pension system.  
1994-2003    210 
This table shows the main focus of state expansion for different periods during 1917-2003 as well as 
the number of SOEs at the end of each period.  
Sources: Aspe (1993) and Informe de Gobierno (Presidencia de la República, 1982-2003). 
 
                                                 
3 The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of National Goods and Administrative Inspection were the two entities 
with overseeing powers established by the 1947 “Law for the Federal Government’s Control of Decentralized 
Institutions and Enterprises of State Participation.” 
  8Starting in the first half of the 1970s, a fall in private investment and stricter restrictions 
imposed by the government consolidated the role of the public sector as the main engine of 
investment. The government borrowed heavily and used income from high oil prices to expand 
the number of SOEs under its control. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the government 
followed a haphazard strategy of taking over companies that fell into financial distress or were of 
particular interest to the politicians in charge. By 1982 there were 1,155 SOEs, and their weight 
in the economy was unprecedented: they accounted for 4.4 percent of the country’s labor force 




The Privatization Program 
 
The Mexican privatization program was one of the world’s largest, both in terms of the number 
of companies privatized and their relative size. Between 1982 and 2003, the number of SOEs 
dropped from 1,155 to 210. Table 2 shows the evolution of the SOE sector from 1982 to 2003, 
while Table 3 shows the number of privatized firms and the number of privatization contracts per 
year for the same period.
5 The scope of the program entailed the privatization of close to 440 
companies in 49 four-digit S.I.C. codes. 
The first period, which lasted from 1982-1988, began as the result of a “Restructuring 
Program” with the aim of increasing the overall efficiency of the public sector. The program 
involved restructuring measures as well as a general “cleaning up” of the sector through 
liquidations, mergers, transfers, and privatizations. This period was also marked by constitutional 
reforms aimed at reducing the economic role of the government; a New Federal Law for SOEs 
clarified the relationship, and obligations between each SOE and the State led to a large 
reduction of unviable operations. Nearly 300 SOEs were liquidated or shut down and 157 were 
privatized. 
 
                                                 
4 According to Aspe (1993), even this number does not capture the true magnitude of the drain that the SOE sector 
represented.  If we include the banking sector operations that lead to the nationalization of commercial banking in 
September 1982, the corrected figure would increase to a staggering 18.5 percent of GDP. 
5 We group our observations in three periods, and for each the privatization strategy often involved splitting 
companies into smaller units or making multi-firm conglomerates For instance, Ferrocarriles Nacionales was split 
into 8 railroads, whereas 35 local airports were sold in packages of about 10 each. 
  9Table 2. State-Owned Enterprises 1982-2003 
 
 State-Owned  Enterprises 
  1982-1988 1989/1993  1994/2003 
   Total at the beginning of period  1,155 666  258 
     Creation  59  39  108 
     Liquidations / Shutdowns  294  193  58 
     Mergers  72  17  16 
     Transfers  25  11  26 
     Privatizations  157  226  56 
     In Process*      37 
   Total at the end of the period:  666 258  210 
This table shows the evolution of state-owned enterprises for the period 1982-2003. To obtain the total 
number of SOEs at the end of each period we: (i) add the number of created SOEs to the number at the 
beginning of the period; and (ii) subtract the liquidations, shutdowns, mergers, transfers and 
privatizations. “Total at the beginning of period” represents the number of legal entities forming part of 
the parastatal sector at the start of each period; “Creation” represents the number of created companies by 
the state in the specified period; “Liquidations / shutdowns” represents the number of companies shut 
down by the state in the specified period; “Mergers” represents the number of state-owned enterprises 
that merged with other state-owned enterprise in the specified period; “Transfers” represents the number 
of state-owned enterprises that were transferred to other levels of government, including firms that ceased 
to be treated as state-owned by legal mandate (Ley Federal de Entidades Paraestatales); “Privatizations” 
represents the number of state-owned enterprises sold in the specified period; “In process” represents the 
number of state-owned enterprises in the specified period with privatizations pending; this number 
reflects the number of ongoing privatizations, liquidations, shutdowns, mergers or transfers in 2003. 
Source: Informe de Gobierno (Presidencia de la República, 1982-2003).  
* The most important ongoing processes are: (i) Banrural System (13 institutions), FIDELIQ, Nacional 
Hotelera de Baja California S.A. de C.V.  
 
 
  The program reached its peak during the Salinas administration, from late 1988 to 1993, 
both in terms of the size and scope of privatizations. Firms sold during this period represent over 
96 percent of all assets privatized, and they employed 311,000 workers, or 35 percent of the total 
workforce of SOEs (López-de-Silanes, 1994). To manage this huge task in such a short time, the 
President created a special unit within the Ministry of Finance, the Office of Privatization of 
State-Owned Enterprises (OP), to coordinate a decentralized process that encouraged the 
involvement of commercial banks, foreign businesses and financial valuators. 
  The third period, from 1994 to 2003, was characterized by the consolidation of previous 
divestiture efforts.  The administration in charge undertook the privatization of strategic areas of 
the economy and public utilities such as telecommunications (including satellite 
telecommunications), ports, airports, toll roads, railroads and the distribution of natural gas. A 
major reform of the private sector pension system, which was managed by the Instituto 
Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS), took place in 1995. By 2003 the privatization program had 
  10lost its appeal, and in fact the government marginally reversed the process by expropriating some 
previously privatized companies.
6 All in all, net privatizations of SOEs were negative in 2003. 
 
Table 3. The Privatization Program in Perspective  
 
 
This table shows the number of companies privatized and the number of privatization 
contracts by year between 1983 and 2003. The difference between these two categories 
stems from the fact that some companies were sold in a bundle with other privatized 
firms while others were split up before the sale.  
Year Companies  Privatized  Number of transactions 
(privatization contracts) 
1983 4  2 
1984 3  1 
1985 32    10 
1986 30  16 
1987 22  17 
1988 66  51 
1989 37  29 
1990 91  63 
1991 65  37 
1992 21  10 
1993 12  8 
1994 1  1 
1995 1  7 
1996 1  16 
1997 2  12 
1998 3  13 
1999 32  5 
2000 16  2 
2001 0  0 
2002 0  0 
2003 0  0 
Total:   439  300 
Source: Informe de Gobierno (Presidencia de la República, 1983-2003). 
 
A central objective of divestiture in Mexico was to transfer SOE control to a private 
majority group providing the necessary alignment in incentives for better financial and 
investment decisions of the firms. As a general rule, the government sold 100 percent of its 
                                                 
6 For example, in 2001 the government expropriated several sugar mills for questionable public interest reasons. In 
addition, between 2001 and 2003 the government created the following enterprises: (i) Consejo Nacional para 
Prevenir la Discriminación; (ii) Servicio de Administración y Enajenación de Bienes; (iii) Consejo Nacional de la 
Cultura Física y el Deporte; and (iv) Instituto Nacional de Lenguas Indígenas. 
  11ownership in each SOE privatized, retaining a minority share in only eight cases.
7 Six of these 
companies are instances where the companies were already trading in the market and the 
intention was to sell secondary packages through the stock exchange.
8  
 
3. The Benefits of Privatization 
 
Critics often argue that the benefits of privatization come at significant cost to society through 
higher prices, lower wages and reduced income for the government (Campbell-White and Bhatia, 
1998; Bayliss, 2002). In this section we analyze the validity of these claims for the case of 
Mexico and find evidence that points to the contrary. We study unadjusted and industry-adjusted 
performance ratios to quantify the effects of privatization on firms and to ensure that these are 
not explained by macroeconomic factors. We then examine the importance of price increases, 
market power and worker exploitation as potential determinants of the observed increase in 





We rely on seven broad indicators to measure performance: (1) profitability; (2) operating 
efficiency; (3) employment and wages; (4) capital investment; (5) output; (6) taxes; and (7) 
prices. For each firm, we measure the change in any given indicator by comparing its value in 
1993 to the average value during the four years preceding privatization.
9  
The results, shown in Table 4, reveal several interesting phenomena. Profitability 
increased significantly after privatization according to all indicators: the mean (median) change 
in profitability ranges from a low of 24.1 (12.1) percentage points for operating income-to-sales 
to a high of 40.0 (14.5) percentage points for net income-to-sales.
 All t-statistics and z-statistics 
are significant at the one-percent level.  
                                                 
7 For a detailed description of the auction process followed for SOE divestitures see López-de-Silanes (1994, 1997). 
8 The clearest case is Telmex (the telephone communications monopoly) where the government originally kept 31 
percent of shares and now owns only 4.75 percent. The other five cases include three banks (Bancomer, Banca 
Serfín, and Banco International) and two companies in transportation (Cia. Mexicana de Aviación and 
Transportación Marítima Mexicana). 
9 We use industry-matched PPI indices to adjust all product prices and the aggregate CPI index to adjust the values 
of all other nominal values.  The choice of deflator is not irrelevant since the CPI series shows higher inflation than 
the PPI series over the sample period. Therefore, the use of the CPI index imparts a conservative bias against finding 
significant increases in sales, earnings, fixed assets, wages and taxes in the post-privatization period. 
  12Table 4. Changes in Performance for the Sample of Privatized Firms 
 
Variable  N  Mean change   Median change  
Profitability      
Operating income/sales  170  0.2411
a 0.1208
a 
Operating income/PPE  170  0.3450
a 0.1347
a 
Net income/sales  170  0.3996
a 0.1447
a 
Net income/PPE  170  0.2713
a 0.1567
a 
Operating efficiency      
Cost per unit  170  -0.2149
a -0.1676
a 
Log (Sales/PPE)  170  0.6464
a 0.2385
a 
Log (Sales/employees)  169  1.0530
a 0.9909
a 
Labor      
Log (Employees)  169  -64.89
a -56.75
a 
Log (Blue-collar workers)  168  -53.44
a -60.87
a 
Log (White-collar workers)  169  -53.52
a -46.34
a 
Assets and investment      
Investment/sales  170  0.0150
c 0.0103
a 
Investment/PPE  170  0.0474
a 0.0216
a 
Output      
Log (Sales)  170  0.5428
a 0.6816
a 
Net taxes      
Net taxes/sales  170  0.1301
a 0.0763
a 
Prices      
Index of Real prices (Paasche)  83  1.31 1.27 
This table presents raw results for a sub-sample of 170 privatized firms between 1983 and 1992. The 
table presents, for each empirical proxy, the number of usable observations, the mean change and the 
median change before and after privatization. “Before privatization” refers to the average value for the 
four years prior to privatization while “after privatization” refers to the value as of 1993. We report t-
statistics and z-statistics (Wilcoxon rank sum) as our test for significance for the change in mean and 
median values respectively. All variables definitions can be found in the Appendix.  
Source: La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999).  
a Significant at 1 percent; 
b Significant at 5 percent; 
c Significant at 10 percent.  “N” number of 
observations. 
  
This increase in profitability seems to stem from significant gains in efficiency. The mean 
(median) cost-per-unit decreased 21.5 (16.8) percentage points while the mean (median) sales-to-
PPE ratio increased 64.6 (23.9) percent. Regarding the efficiency of employees, both mean and 
median sales-per-employee double. Once again, all changes are significant at the one-percent 
level. 
  The higher profitability and especially the higher levels of sales-per-employees can be 
partially explained by reduced employment levels, as the mean (median) numbers of employees 
plummet by 64.9 (56.8) percent. This reduction is shared more or less equally between blue and 
  13white-collar workers: the mean (median) number of white-collar workers falls by 53.5 (46.3) 
percent while the mean (median) number of blue-collar workers falls by 53.4 (60.9) percent.
10 
The data indicate that investment increases only slightly and therefore cannot be 
responsible for the vast increase in profitability and operating efficiency documented above. The 
mean (median) investment-to-sales ratio increased 1.5 (1.0) percentage points and the 
investment-to-PPE ratio increased by a mean (median) of 4.7 (2.2) percentage points.  
One of the most surprising findings is that privatized firms increased their sales 
substantially despite a reduced labor force and only marginal increments in their capital stock. 
The mean (median) real growth in sales is 54.3 (68.2) percent and is statistically significant at the 
one percent level.
11 Once we consider that there is no statistically significant increase in product 
prices of privatized firms, the increase in production suggests that the consumer surplus should 
have also increased significantly.  
  To assess the social impact of privatization, we must also account for the taxes paid by 
newly privatized firms and prices paid by consumers. The ratio of net taxes to sales increased by 
a mean (median) of 13.0 (7.6) percent, a significant increase when we consider that sales 
increased substantially. The magnitude of this change is more evident when we consider that the 
average firm received a small subsidy before privatization but paid approximately US$8.55 
million in taxes in 1993.  
Regarding prices, we find that, contrary to predictions, the products of the mean (median) 
firm increased only 1.3 (1.3) percent in real terms. One way to gauge the contribution of price 
hikes to the observed change in profitability is to compare the observed percentage-points 
increase in operating-income-to-sales to that which would take place if privatized firms had 
increased output but left prices unchanged in real terms.
12  
                                                 
10 Even though these figures seem large, they probably underestimate the true level of labor retrenchment 
experienced by privatized firms. In fact, looking at the sub-sample of firms for which we have complete 
employment data for all four pre-privatization years (117), we find that the mean (median) number of workers falls 
16.53 (4.19) percent between t-4 and t-1 and a further 62.36 (64.74) percent between t-1 and 1993.  
11 It is possible that this increase in output overestimates the true impact of privatization as some of the observed 
gains may simply reflect redistribution away from customers. Some SOEs priced their output below market levels or 
failed to charge for goods and services produced because of corruption, political meddling or sheer incompetence.  
Although there is no way to directly quantify the importance of these factors in our sample, available evidence 
regarding the evolution of prices for the products of privatized firms suggests this is not the driving force behind 
increased sales.  
12 Specifically, we define Sales1993 and Cost1993, respectively, as sales and operating costs in the post-privatization 
period and π as the increase in real prices, and compute the following measure for the contribution of price increases 
to higher profitability: 
  14Our results suggest that price increases account for 1.24 (0.9) percentage points of the 
ratio of operating income to sales. Accordingly, price increases explain about 5.1 percent of the 
observed change in mean operating-income-to-sales and 7.4 percent of the change in the 
observed median operating-income-to-sales. The evidence above does not support the hypothesis 




During the early 1990s, the Mexican economy experienced a significant structural transformation 
and growth accelerated. To ensure that the increases in performance documented in the previous 
section are not driven by macroeconomic factors, we measure the performance of privatized 
firms relative to those of the industry to which they belong.  
 

























































Before privatization After privatization  
The figure presents the net-income-to-sales, the operating-income-to-sales and the cost-per-unit median gap 
between privatized SOEs and private firms, before and after privatization for a sub-sample of 170 privatized 
firms between 1983 and 1992. “Before privatization” refers to the average value for the four years prior to 
privatization while “after privatization” refers to the value as of 1993. All variables definitions can be found in 
the Appendix.  
Source: La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
() () { } 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 Price Contribution =  Sales Cost Sales Sales 1+ Cost Sales 1+ π π    −− −         
  15Figure 1 illustrates the closing gap between privatized and private firms. After 
dramatically underperforming their private peers in net-income-to-sales, operating-income-to-
sales and costs-per-unit ratios, privatized firms caught up and even surpassed them. The most 
remarkable results are found for the ratio of net income to sales, where private firms were 17.2 
percentage points less profitable than private firms before privatization and 4 points more 
profitable afterwards. Costs per unit show a similar converging trend, albeit from a different 
starting point. Before privatization, SOEs had median costs per unit 14.2 percentage points 
higher than their private competitors. After privatization they closed this gap completely and 
even experienced costs per unit 1 percentage point below their control group. 
Table 5 shows that controlling for industry factors explains a non-trivial fraction of the 
employment cuts. Relative to industry benchmarks, mean (median) employment in privatized 
firms fell by roughly 35.4 (34.4) percent. Growth in sales remains strong relative to industry as 
the mean (median) industry-adjusted growth in sales is 43.2 (48.9) percent. Macroeconomic 
factors can therefore account for only about 21.4 (28.2) percent of the mean (median) growth in 




Industry-Adjusted Changes in Performance for the Sample of Privatized Firms 
 N  Mean  change  Median  change
Profitability      
Operating income/sales  168  0.3264
a 0.1531
a 
Operating income/PPE  168  2.4274
a 0.1492
a 
Net income/sales  168  0.4144
a 0.2121
a 
Net income/PPE  168  0.2524
a 0.1736
a 
Operating efficiency      
Cost per unit  168  -0.1848
a -0.1528
a 
Log (Sales/PPE)  168  0.4684
a 0.2014
b 
Log (Sales/employees)  168  0.9157
a 0.8834
a 
Labor      
Log (Employees)  169  -35.35
a -34.37
a 
Log (Blue-collar workers)  168  -36.78
a -32.61
a 
Log (White-collar workers)  168  -32.21
a -31.59
a 
                                                 
13 We can calculate the macroeconomic contribution to the growth in sales by measuring the difference in raw and 
industry-adjusted indicators (0.1164 and 0.1925 respectively) as a proportion of the raw increase (0.5428 and 0.6816 
respectively).  
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 N  Mean  change  Median  change
Assets and investment      
Investment/sales 168  -0.0474
a -0.0495
a 
Investment/PPE 168  -0.0328
a -0.0503
a 
Output      
Log (Sales)  170  0.4324
a 0.4891
a 
Net taxes      




This table presents industry-adjusted results for a sub-sample of 170 privatized firms between 1983 
and 1992. The table presents, for each empirical proxy, the number of usable observations, the mean 
change and the median change before and after privatization. “Before privatization” refers to the 
average value for the four years prior to privatization while “after privatization” refers to the value as 
of 1993. We constructed the industry control groups using all private firms trading in the Mexican 
Stock Market (three-digit S.I.C. level). For each privatized SOE and for each year, we compute 
industry-adjusted indicators by taking the difference between the value of the indicator for the SOE 
and its industry control group. We use economy-wide aggregates, if available, for those firms for 
which we cannot find a matched industry sample. We report t-statistics and z-statistics (Wilcoxon 
rank sum) as our test for significance for the change in mean and median values respectively. All 
variables definitions can be found in the Appendix.  
Source: La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999). 
a Significant at 1 percent; 
b Significant at 5 percent; 




Although some of the improvements in performance are due to macroeconomic factors, 
the bulk of the observed increase in performance is due to privatization. The next step is to 
address a number of issues relating to the robustness of our results. In particular, we explore the 
hypothesis that the increased profitability of privatized firms is due to exploitation of consumers 




One of the main criticisms of privatization is that the increase in profitability is due to transfers 
from consumers extracted through market power. To test this hypothesis, we compare the 
profitability of privatized firms in competitive and non-competitive industries. If newly-
privatized firms use market power to extract rents, the social view of privatization predicts that 
non-competitive firms would experience larger increases in profitability than competitive firms, 
and lower growth in output, employment and investment. In Table 6 we classify firms as 
  17operating in competitive or non-competitive industries based on two objective criteria.
14 The 
table shows, for each ratio, the median change for competitive and non-competitive firms 
following privatization as well as the difference between these changes.  
Changes in both operating-income-to-sales and operating-income-to-PPE are higher in 
competitive industries than in non-competitive ones. On the other hand, both net-income-to-sales 
and net-income-to-PPE increase more in the non-competitive sector than in the competitive one. 
With one exception (net-income-to-sales in the classification based on the number of firms), all 
differences between the competitive and non-competitive sectors are statistically insignificant.  
By construction, three factors can account for the conflicting behavior of operating 
income and net income: taxes, extraordinary items, and interest expense. The increase in taxes 
paid is larger for non-competitive firms than competitive firms and therefore its explanatory 
power is diminished. Changes in leverage provide a more promising explanation. We conjecture 
that firms in oligopolistic and monopolistic sectors, perhaps due to their greater pre-privatization 
access to government-backed capital, exhibit greater reductions in leverage in the post-
privatization period than firms in competitive ones. Finally, it is also possible that SOEs’ net 
income was unduly depressed by pre-privatization restructuring charges. The bottom line is that 
operating income, in contrast to net income, is unaffected by changes in leverage and is thus a 
better gauge for the impact of market power on profits. In any event, differences in profitability 
changes are not statistically significant.  
We also analyze the behavior of investment, employment, and output and find no 
statistically significant evidence to suggest that market power plays a significant role in 
explaining the increased profitability of privatized firms. In any case, the differences that exist 
point towards a more dynamic restructuring in the non-competitive sector relative to the 
competitive one. For example, costs per unit according to the number of firm’s criteria decreased 
11 percentage points more in non-competitive firms, while sales per employees according to the 
market share criteria increased 34 percent more than in competitive firms. 
Perhaps the most interesting result is the behavior of real prices. Not only does the 
increase in the non-competitive sector lag behind that of the competitive sector, but prices in the 
former actually fell. According to the market-share criteria, the growth of prices in the 
                                                 
14 Under the first criteria, firms are considered competitive if they are in an industry with more than 10 firms and as 
non-competitive otherwise. Under the second criteria, firms are considered competitive if they have less than 10 
  18competitive sector was 9.29 percent while that of the non-competitive sector was -2.82 percent. 
This difference is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. All in all, we find no evidence 
that market power or the exploitation of consumers explains the increased profitability of 
privatized firms.  
Table 6. 
Median Performance Changes in Privatized Firms 
in Competitive versus Noncompetitive Industries 
 
  Sorted by number of firms  Sorted by market share 
Variable 
N Competitive  N  Non-
Competitive 
 Difference 
in medians  N   Competitive  N  Non-
Competitive 
 Difference in 
medians 
Profitability                
Operating income/sales  124 0.1365 42 0.1334  0.0031   104   0.1799  62 0.0712  0.1087  
Operating income/PPE  124 0.1714 42 0.1698  0.0016   103   0.1832  62 0.1222  0.0610  
Net income/sales  122 0.1838 41 0.4260  -0.2422
b  101   0.2263  62 0.2524  -0.0261  
Net income/PPE  122 0.2102 41 0.2781  -0.0679   101   0.2015  62 0.2716  -0.0701  
Operating efficiency               
Cost per unit  124 -0.1255 42 -0.2362  0.1107
a  104   0.1415  62 0.1907  -0.0492  
Log (Sales/employees)  126 1.0353 43 0.7875  0.2478   107   1.0877  62 0.7474  0.3403
b 
Log (Sales/PPE)  124 0.5882 42 0.3313  0.2569   104   0.6429  62 0.2859  0.3570  
Operating Income/Employees  125 19.7240 43 20.9320  -1.2080    106   21.6320  62 14.9110  6.7210  
Labor                  
Log (Total Employment)  126 -0.4339 43 -0.3592  -0.0747   107   -0.4338  62 -0.3645  -0.0693  
Log (Blue-collar workers)  126 -0.4365 43 -0.2473  -0.1892   107   -0.4495  62 -0.2518  -0.1977  
Log (White-collar workers)  126 -0.4264 43 -0.3342  -0.0922   107   -0.3327  62 -0.4443  0.1116  
  Sorted by number of firms  Sorted by market share 
ble 
N Competitive  N  Non-
Competitive 
 Difference 
in medians  N   Competitive  N  Non-
Competitive 
 Difference in 
medians 
Assets and investment               
Investment/sales  123 0.0059 42 0.0098  -0.0039   104   0.0048  62 0.0096  -0.0048  
Investment/PPE  123 0.0144 42 0.0180  -0.0036   104   0.0144  62 0.0191  -0.0047  
Output                  
Log (Sales )  124 0.6479 42 0.3752  0.2727   105   0.6479  61 0.4419  0.2060  
Prices                  
Index of Real Prices (Paasche)  66 4.60  17 -3.64  8.24   53   9.29  30 -2.82  12.1148
c 
Net taxes                  
Net taxes/sales  124 0.0717 41 0.0897  -0.0180      104   0.0675  61 0.0815  -0.0140  
 
This table presents median performance results for a sub-sample of 170 privatized firms between 1983 and 1992. 
The table breaks down performance results into competitive and noncompetitive sectors based on two objective 
measures: (1) firms are considered competitive if they are in an industry with more than 10 firms and as non-
competitive otherwise; (2) firms are considered competitive if they have less than 10 percent of market share and as 
non-competitive otherwise. For each group of firms, the table presents median change in each indicator following 
privatization and their difference. Before privatization refers to the average value for the four years prior to 
privatization while after privatization refers to the value as of 1993.  We report z-statistics (Wilcoxon rank sum) as 
our test for significance for the change in median values between competitive and non-competitive firms. All 
definitions of the variables can be found in the Appendix.  
Source: La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999).
a Significant at 1 percent; 
b Significant at 5 percent; 
c Significant at 
10 percent.  “N” represents the number of observations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
percent of market share and as non-competitive otherwise. 
  19Transfers from Workers  
 
In this section, we consider the role of labor retrenchment in explaining the large gains in 
profitability experienced by privatized firms. The redistribution hypothesis links post-
privatization gains in profitability to transfers from workers to shareholders, as wages fall from 
above-market levels induced by income-redistribution goals. Political models of state ownership 
also imply that SOE workers are overpaid, but unlike redistribution models they lack strong 
predictions regarding the behavior of wages in the post-privatization period. This uncertainty is 
due to the fact that public sector jobs are attractive for several reasons besides pay; for example, 
they may be desirable because they do not require much effort or because they provide the 
opportunity to collect bribes in exchange for public services. We try to quantify the contribution 
of layoffs and wage cuts to the observed changes in profitability. Examining changes in real 
wages is a natural way to test competing hypotheses regarding the channels through which 
privatization works.  
Contrary to the predictions of the redistribution hypothesis, available evidence shows that 
real wages increased substantially for the mean and median firm (see Table 7). Real wages per 
worker increased by a mean (median) of almost 80 (125) percent. This is even more striking 
since overall real wages in Mexico stagnated during the sample period. Furthermore, gains by 
blue-collar workers are larger than gains by white-collar workers. Even though white-collar 
wages increased substantially, the mean and median index of industry-adjusted blue-collar wages 
rose much more—well over 100 percent. Although both skilled and unskilled workers 
experience impressive increases in wages, it is the least well off that gain the most.  
To provide an estimate of the cost savings due to layoffs, we make the extreme 
assumption that the marginal product of all fired workers is zero and calculate what the increase 
in profitability would have been if no workers were fired. Even in this extreme case, savings due 
to layoffs are not as large as the reductions in employment suggest. This is so for two reasons: 
first, total wages represent only 23.38 percent of sales in the pre-privatization period, and second, 
labor costs in the post-privatization period are spread over a much wider base since sales 
increase significantly. Our estimate yields a saving due to layoffs equivalent to 6.80 (4.45) 
percent of sales in 1993. During the same period, the mean (median) of operating-income-to-
sales increased 22.12 (9.59) percentage points. Therefore, savings due to layoffs account for only 
31 to 46 percent of the observed gains in profitability. If, instead of assuming that fired workers’ 
  20value added is equal to zero, we assume they are half as productive as retained workers, savings 
due to layoffs drop to between 15 and 23 percent of the increase in profitability. 
 
Table 7. The Role of Transfers from Workers 
 
Variable Mean  Median 
 








Index of real wages per worker  101  100.00  179.64
a 100.00 224.92
a 
Index of industry-adjusted real 
wages per worker  101  100.00 209.30
 a 100.00 198.96
a 
Index of real wages per blue-
collar worker  101  100.00 235.43
a 100.00 248.14
a 
Index of industry-adjusted real 
blue-collar wages  101  100.00 265.61
a 100.00 222.43
a 
Index of Real wages per white-
collar worker  101  100.00 158.26
a 100.00 200.95
a 
Index of industry-adjusted white 
collar wages  101  100.00 177.97
a 100.00 147.92
a 
Index of total employment  101  100.00  57.92
a 100.00 58.05
a 
Total wages/sales  101  0.2338  0.1441
a 0.1506 0.1143
a 




The table presents data of total number of workers, blue collar and white-collar workers for a sub-sample of 
101 privatized firms between 1983 and 1992 for which we have full employment data. For each empirical 
proxy we show mean and median real wages per worker and the index of industry-adjusted real wages per 
worker for all three groups. “Before privatization” refers to the average value for the four years prior to 
privatization while “after privatization” refers to the value as of 1993. We report t-statistics and z-statistics 
(Wilcoxon rank sum) as our test for significance for the change in mean and median values respectively.  
All variables definitions can be found in the Appendix.  
Source: La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999). 
 a Significant at 1 percent.  
b Significant at 5 percent.  




In conclusion, real wages experience large increases in the post-privatization period 
probably because those workers that are retained are required to work and are paid accordingly.
15 
Overall, the high level of labor redundancy in the pre-privatization period, the observed increases 
in real wages, and the productivity gains in the post-privatization period are consistent with the 
political view.  
 
                                                 
15 To confirm the robustness of our interpretations, we carried out a poll to determine the principal perceived reasons 
for increased wages. The essential element of the respondents’ explanation was that SOE jobs were desirable not 
because they paid well, but rather that they required little effort. After privatization, employers quickly moved to 
dismiss workers who did not increase their productivity and hired new workers from a different pool than those who 
were hired under state management. Firms retained the most productive workers and offered them conditions similar 
to both those prevailing in the private sector and those offered to new hires. We therefore believe that higher wages 
are explained by improvements in worker productivity. 
  21Services and Access 
 
The Mexican privatization program spread benefits to society beyond its direct effects on prices 
and firm profitability. These benefits take the form of greater access, extended coverage and 
enhanced quality of the services provided by the privatized firms. Table 8 summarizes some of 
these benefits. Among the most important improvements are a dramatic increase in freight road 
transport and in the provision of natural gas; a substantial increase in the capacity and efficiency 
of the port system and substantial investments and increased coverage in the provision of running 
water and sanitation. The table presents some examples of other benefits of privatization for 
specific sectors. 
 
Table 8. Other Benefits of Privatization Programs  
 
Program Impacts 
Freight road transport  Between 1988 and 1993, the number of firms providing freight road transport 
service nearly tripled—from 4,456 to 12,972. The number of trucks increased from 
58,133 to 142,973. 
Natural gas  Between 1996 and 2000, the Comisión Reguladora de Energía (CRE) awarded 21 
gas distribution permits under which concessionaires were obligated to serve 2.3 
million customers by 2004. This represents a 15-fold increase in the customer base 
relative to 1995.  
Passenger road 
transport 
The impact of the reform has been seen in: (i) increased entry of new firms or 
regularization and registration of existing firms; (ii) increased demand (between 
1990 and 1996 the number of total passengers transported increased from 1.97 
million to 2.75 million and the number of vehicles rose from 36,593 to 53,133); 
and (iii) quality and reliability of services have also improved significantly. 
Ports  There have been huge increases in installed capacity (from 59 million tons in 1993 
to 94 millions in 1998) and capacity utilization (from 41 percent in 1993 to 59 
percent in 1998). In 1993, the port of Veracruz was handling 43 containers/hour 
per ship. This figure has now risen to 84. Manzanillo moves 65 containers/hour per 
ship, and Altamira has achieved the international standard of 50 moves per hour. In 
Veracruz, the total capacity for loading/unloading agricultural bulk cargo improved 
from 2,500 to 9,000 tons/day between 1995 and 1998, with the port of Progreso 
showing similar improvement. 
Railroads  New operators invested more than P$3 billion on maintenance of infrastructure and 
the renewal of rolling stock during 1997-1998 and another P$3.3 billion during 
1999. In 1998 the total volume of freight handled by the rail system in Mexico 
increased by 21.5 percent with respect to 1997. 
Telecommunications  During the 1990s the number of wire-line telephones in service doubled, wireless 
telephony grew from negligible levels to nearly 40 percent of all telephones; and 
waiting lists for service virtually disappeared during the first decade after 
privatization. 
Toll roads  The highway concession program doubled the length of existing toll highways 
(from 4,500 km in 1989 to 9,900 km in 1994). 
Urban water supply 
and sanitation 
A 1994 amendment to the federal water law initiated a program of concessions in 
water supply and sanitation. By the year 2000, approximately 14 million Mexicans 
were served by water systems with varying degrees of private participation 
(including the Federal District service contracts). Private investments totaling $400 
million have been committed, and private operators are handling approximately 16 
percent of the 43m/s of wastewater effluent that is treated. 
 
Sources: World Bank (2003) and Rogozinski and Tovar (1998). 
  224. Fiscal Impact 
 
This section explores the fiscal impact of the privatization program as well as its effects on other 
macroeconomic variables. There are four primary components to the fiscal impact of 
privatization: (1) the direct revenue generated from the sale; (2) the costs incurred due to 
restructuring prior to the sale; (3) the elimination of the net flow of subsidies and transfers from 
the government to the SOEs; and (4) the new stream of tax payments generated under private 
ownership.  
  Direct revenues from the sale of SOEs were a major source of government revenue. The 
aggregate value of the program from 1983 to 2003 amounts to slightly over 5.3 per cent of 2003 
GDP (see Table 9), with the second period accounting for the vast majority of these sales (79 
percent). About one-third of privatization contracts required “cash-only” payment, and the vast 
majority of the remaining contracts allowed only very short-term debt lasting no more than a few 
years. Because most firms were sold for cash and no long-term debt was exchanged, the cash vs. 
debt component of privatization plays only a marginal role in the case of Mexico.  
  Costs due to restructuring were by no means negligible; the government spent 
substantial resources restructuring firms prior to privatization, particularly through labor 
retrenchment programs. Although the first period had fewer prior restructuring measures, their 
costs amounted to one-half of total direct revenues. During the second period, firms were 
restructured more often, but total costs were only equivalent to one-third of total revenues. In any 
case, it is clear that restructuring costs were significant.  
 
  23Table 9. 
The Fiscal Impact of Privatization: 1983-2003 
(As percentage of 2003 GDP) 
 
Period 





Net subsidies during 
the 4 years prior to 
privatization 
1983 – 1988  0.40  0.20  0.18 
1989 – 1993  4.20  1.30  0.35 
1994 – 2003  0.73  n.a.   n.a. 
Total 5.32  1.51  0.53 
Number of privatization contracts 255  220  95 
 
The table presents the fiscal impact of the privatization program by period as a percentage of 2003 GDP. 
The second column shows the discounted nominal price of the privatization contracts excluding revenues 
from secondary offers of shares in the stock exchange market; the third column show the restructuring costs 
and the fourth column present a computation of the subsidies net of dividends, revenues and restructuring 
costs associated with privatization during the four years prior to privatization.  
Source: Data collected by the  authors from the original privatization sales and prospectuses from the 
Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público and Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (2000).  
n.a. = not available.   
 
  Subsidies and transfers accounted for a significant percentage of the overall government 
budget—totaling almost 13 percent of GDP in 1982.
16  Table 9 provides a measure of subsidies 
net of dividends, revenues, and restructuring costs associated with privatization during the four-
year period prior to privatization, and reveals that these operations imposed a large net burden on 
the public finances. During the first privatization period, net subsidies over the four years prior to 
privatization equaled 0.18 percent of 2003 GDP; almost half of the sale price of the privatized 
firms. During the second period, net subsidies were over twice their previous value but 
represented only about 8 percent of the nominal price of privatization contracts.  
  Overall, the evidence suggests that privatization had a positive and significant impact in 
the fiscal position of the government. The Operating Balance and total Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirements show a significant turnaround. In fact, during the second period (1989-1993) the 
government’s budget deficit (without considering direct privatization revenues) climbed from 16 
percent of GDP to a small budget surplus (see Figure 2). Furthermore, the greater fiscal 
discipline afforded by privatization contributed to a sharp reduction in inflation and, therefore, to 
improved macroeconomic stability (López-de-Silanes, 1994).  
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Subsidies and transfers to the total SOE sector Public sector total operational balance Public sector borrowing requirements 
 
The figure shows the evolution of the subsidies and transfers to the total SOE sector, the public sector 
borrowing requirements a nd the public sector total operational balance as a percentage of annual GDP. 
Source: Data collected by the authors from several issues of “Cuenta Pública” (SHCP, 1982-2003), 




  The funds obtained from the sale of SOEs were allocated to three principal uses: (i) an 
emergency “Contingency Fund” to protect against non-recurrent external shocks; (ii) a fund 
destined to reduce the stock of external debt; and (iii) a permanent increase in the budget for 
education and social assistance. The relative composition of public and private investment also 
changed because of privatization: total government investment in the economy shrunk from over 
one-tenth of GDP in 1982 to less than three percent in 2001.
17  During this period, investments 
by SOEs fell from over one-half of private investment to under one-tenth, reflecting the joint 
effect of lower government involvement in the economy and a recovery of private investment. 
  Foreign investors also become active via foreign direct investment because of the 
privatization program. Although they won only 9 percent of all Privatization Contracts 
auctioned, they engaged in joint ventures with domestic investors for an additional 11 percent of 
privatization contracts, including several of the largest firms (see Table 10). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 Based on data from several issues of “Cuenta Pública” (SHCP, 1982-2003), “Informe sobre la Situación 
Económica” (SHCP, 1982-2003). 
17 “Informe sobre la Situación Económica” (SHCP, 1982-2003). 
  25Table 10. Foreign Direct Investment in Privatization 
 




1983 - 1988 1989 - 1993  1994 - 2003
Present value of sale 
price as a percentage of 
average FDI flows  
Foreign  6 8 9  15.58 
Foreign-Domestic  Joint  Venture  4 16 8  67.35 
Domestic 77  110  18  171.96 
Total 87  134  35  255.17 
 
This table presents the number of privatization contracts by period and origin of the wining investor as well as their 
present value as a percentage of the average foreign direct investment during 1983-2003. Source: Data collected by 
the authors from the original privatization sales and prospectuses from the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 
Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes (SCT) and Banco de México. 
 
  The net effect of these factors contributed to the radical reduction of government debt 
experienced by Mexico over the past 20 years. As shown in Figure 3, total debt, both internal and 
external, has dropped from a high of 80.7 percent of GDP in 1986 to only 38.7 percent in 1991 
and 27 percent in 2001. Although the stock of external debt increased sharply prior to the 1995 
crisis, and the stock of internal debt has increased continuously since 1996, it is clear that 
Mexico’s debt situation is very different from what it was 15 or 20 years ago. The privatization 
program, through its fiscal windfall and especially the lower financial requirements of a reduced 
SOE sector, is one of the main factors that explain this transformation.  
 













































































































External debt Domestic debt  
 
The figure shows the evolution of the average balance of the domestic and external debt as a percentage of 
GDP and includes debt held by the federal government, government enterprises and entities, development 
banks, and official trust funds.  
Source: Data collected by the authors from several issues of “Cuenta Pública” (SHCP, 1982-2003), 
“Informe sobre la Situación Económica” (SHCP, 1982-2003) and “The Mexican Economy” (Banco de 
México, 1996-1999).   
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Allocative efficiency refers to the idea that firms should be placed in the hands of those who 
value them the most. The guiding principle behind the idea of maximizing allocative efficiency 
is that any other mechanism would provide an inferior potential welfare outcome as any 
distribution goal can be achieved by giving the asset to those who value it the most and then 
taxing them to compensate others. Some privatization programs, particularly in former 
communist countries, used voucher mechanisms to achieve a direct transfer of resources. These 
programs gave each individual a share of the formerly national industry with the objective of 
achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth and to prevent a few rich investors from 
pocketing most of the potential gains from privatization.  
    Recent literature on the subject (World Bank, 1992; and Maskin, 1992) has emphasized 
that voucher programs are less efficient than fiscal policy in achieving wealth distribution and 
are subject to more problems. Diffused shareholders are often bought out at deep discounts by 
agents with asymmetric information, and entrenched management can more easily resist reform 
because there is no organized pressure from the new owners. Because of this, it seems a wiser 
idea for governments to follow a process similar to Mexico’s, which focused its attention on 
maximizing allocative efficiency and then used the proceeds from privatization to benefit the rest 
of the population. As of June 1992, the Mexican privatization program involved a total of over 
2,200 interested individuals and companies who formally requested information and 839 actual 
bidders. This wide participation is one of the main reasons for the high prices paid for privatized 
firms in Mexico (López-de-Silanes, 1997). 
    As a result of the income derived from privatization programs, spending on education and 
social assistance increased dramatically. The resources generated and liberated by privatization 
account for a significant share of these programs, and have helped the levels of education, health, 
and regional developments regain its pre-1982 crisis levels (around 9 percent of GDP). For 
example, in 1992, the education budget increased 9.5 percent in real terms, while the Health and 
Social Services sector received an increase of 7.7 percent, and transfers to rural development 
programs increased almost 40 percent (López-de-Silanes, 1994).  
 
  285. Dos and Don’ts in Privatization 
 
The Mexican privatization program provides an excellent opportunity to study the effects of 
different privatization policies and restructuring programs. Privatization requires heavy 
government involvement and is usually fraught with conflicts of interest as politicians set up the 
method and run the process through which they end up either “selling their own firms” or “firing 
themselves or their friends” (Perotti, 1995; Biais and Perotti, 2002; Bortolotti, Fantini and 
Scarpa, 2001; Earle and Gehlbach, 2003). Table 11 shows the most common restructuring 
measures adopted prior to privatization and their frequency in the different periods of the 
Mexican privatization program.  
  The most popular restructuring measures in both periods are labor retrenchment and debt 
absorption; which were carried out with the hope that bidders would be willing to pay more for 
firms that have been restructured in this way. During the second period, other restructuring 
mechanisms such as changing the management team, firing the CEO and implementing 
investment and efficiency programs were much more common.  
 
Table 11. Restructuring Actions Prior to Privatization 
 
Actions  Number of privatization contracts 
1983-1988           1989-1992 
 1. Management    
    1.a) CEO replaced  11  25 
    1.b) Change of management team  15  54 
    1.c) Change or creation of board of directors  1  30 
 2. Labor    
    2.a) Labor cuts  24  65 
    2.b) Collective contract canceled  4  13 
    2.c) Collective contract renegotiated  3  10 
 3. Debt absorption     
    3.a) Outsiders debt   23  53 
    3.b) Cross Liabilities   10  45 
    3.c) Fiscal debt   11  37 
4. Efficiency Programs    
   4.a) Performance measures  6  29 
   4.b) Increased management responsibilities  0  27 
5. Investment Programs    
   5.a) Investment-Performance Agreements  10  29 
   5.b) Other Investment programs  5  1 
6. De-investment measures  9  32 
  29                 Table 11., continued 
 
Actions  Number of privatization contracts 
1983-1988           1989-1992 
7. Legal Measures    
   7.a) Legal debt absorption or solution of disputes  2  15 
   7.b) Negotiations with minority shareholders  11  9 
   7.c) Reorganization or changes in legal status  7  11 
8. Assets Restructure    
   8.a) Clarify or document assets ownership  7  22 
   8.b) Patent Registrations  1  5 
   8.c) Breaking-up companies for sale  3  37 
   8.d) Bundling companies for sale  14  4 
   8.e) Assets spin-offs  10  14 
Number of privatization contracts in the sample  87 134 
 
The table shows the main groups of restructuring actions prior to privatization and their 
frequency by period for a sub-sample of 221 privatization contracts in Mexico between 
1983 and 1992. Some privatization contracts did not undergo any of the actions listed 
above, while others underwent several restructuring actions simultaneously. Prior 
restructuring actions are classified into eight major groups, which are themselves further 
subdivided. The exact definition of each restructuring group can be found in the Appendix.  
Source: Data collected by the authors from the original privatization sales and prospectuses 
from the Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público.  
 
  To assess the impact of different restructuring measures on the price paid for privatized 
firms, we need to construct a variable that controls for the value of the firm sold and captures the 
resources that accrue to the government from the sale of the SOE. We propose an approximation 
of Tobin’s Q—the ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its physical 










 is the Price received by the government once all restructuring costs have been 
deducted;
18 sh is the number of shares sold; TD are total liabilities at the time of privatization; 
and TA are total assets at the time of privatization. The PQ standardization considers GNPPi as 
                                                 
18 Specifically, GNPP is calculated as follows:  
* GNPP B P R GC Adj ′ =− − −  
where (B') is the present value of the nominal price of sale as registered in the sale contract which is adjusted in the 
following ways: (a) subtraction of the cost of the restructuring measures (P*R) undertaken by the government prior 
to the sale; (b) subtraction of the costs of the  “Government Commitments” and the  “Special Clauses” promised by 
the government at the time of the sale (GC), matching them with the actual bills paid later on; and (c) 
addition/subtraction of the adjustments made to the sale contract (Adj), which includes reimbursements on both 
sides when the financial statements differ from the ones given to the bidders before the sale. 
  30the proxy for market value of stock while controlling for debt and assets and allows for the 
calculation of a good proxy for Tobin’s Q.
19 
The estimations shown in this section regarding the effects of the sale process on 
privatization prices considers PQ as the dependent variable and firm-specific characteristics, 
industry characteristics, auction requirements and restructuring measures undertaken prior to 
privatization as the independent variables. OLS results as well as Instrumental Variable results 
that take into account the possible endogeneity of our proposed measures are shown in Table 12.  
 
Table 12. Prior Restructuring: Dos and Don’ts 
Independent variables  Percentage change in 
Privatization Q (OLS) 
Percentage change in 
Privatization Q (IV) 
















Non-control package dummy  -90.89
a -78.28
b 
Auction process and requirements    




Additional bidder in final round  16.96
a 11.64
b 
FDI allowed dummy  31.56
c 29.63
c 
Cash-sale only dummy  -30.41a -26.52a 
Prior restructuring policies    
CEO change dummy  34.13a 54.88
b 
Percentage of labor cuts
5 -2.82a 12.28
c 
Debt absorbed/total liabilities  -40.89  11.44 
Efficiency measures dummy  -14.71a -56.09a 
Investment measures dummy  2.40a -95.31a 
De-investment measures dummy  -16.57a 3.96a 
 
The table shows the effect of firm and industry characteristics, auction characteristics and requirements, and prior 
restructuring policies on the mean Privatization Q for a sub-sample of 140 firms privatized in Mexico between 1983 
and 1992 for which full information is available. We calculate the effect of: (1) a ten percentage-point increase in 
the net income to sales ratio; (2) an additional strike; (3) a ten percentage-point increase in the governments pre-
privatization market share of the industry of the privatized SOEs; (4) an additional month in the length of sale; and 
(5) a ten percent reduction in the labor force. For all other variables, we show the discrete change of the dummy 
from zero to one. The first column considers prior restructuring measures and the rest of the variables as 
“exogenous” and uses estimates from an OLS regression. The second column shows the second step of the two-step 
instrumental variables (IV) procedure in which prior restructuring measures, total length of sale from rumors to 
completion and the number of bidder in the final round are treated as potentially endogenous variables. All variables 
definitions can be found in the Appendix.  Source: López-de-Silanes (1997).  
a Significant at 1 percent; 
b Significant at 5 percent; 
c Significant at 10 percent. 
                                                 
19 As a robustness check, an additional standardization was calculated in the same fashion but using total 
shareholders’ equity (defined as the sum of total assets and total liabilities at the time of privatization) to normalize 
the Privatization Q.  The results obtained from this estimate are very similar and are thus omitted.  
  31Firm and Industry Characteristics 
 
All firm and industry characteristics show their expected effect on PQ and are statistically 
significant. An increase of 10 percentage points on the ratio of net income to sales increases PQ 
by 15 to16 percent depending on the specification used. A more aggressive labor force, measured 
by the cost of firing workers or by the number of strikes suffered in the years leading up to 
privatization, significantly reduces the price received for privatized firms. For example, an 
additional strike in the five years leading up to privatization lowers PQ by 17 to 23 percent. 
Government involvement in the industry significantly increases the price paid for a privatized 
firm but privatizations that do not transfer control of firms to private hands are sold at a 
significant discount. A 10 percentage-point increase in the market share of public enterprises 
increases PQ by about 7 percent, probably as a result of protection against competition granted to 
sectors under heavy state control.
20 In contrast, the sale of government holdings in private firms 
was heavily penalized. The average non-control privatization fetched PQs 91 to 78 percent lower 
than control privatizations, probably as a result of poor corporate governance and deficient 
enforcement of shareholder’s rights, which fueled investors’ fears that they would be exploited 
by the current majority shareholder.  
  
Auction Process and Requirements 
 
Auction requirements make a substantial difference in the net price received by the government. 
Bans on foreign participation reduced PQs by 30 to 32 percent. Cash-only sales, another 
common restriction, were popular because they lowered the government’s risk of future breaches 
of contract and provided an instant infusion into the treasury. Nevertheless, these advantages 
must be carefully weighed against the 27 to 30 percent discount in PQ they entailed. It is 
important to point out that these penalties are independent of the fact that they lower auction 
competition, a substantial factor when we consider that an additional bidder in the final round 
increased PQ by 12 to 17 percent for the average firm.  
The speed at which privatization takes place also has important effects on the net price 
raised. While there are potential costs of rushing a sale, the benefits of a quick process include 
disposing of money-losing firms and avoiding costly restructuring. Additionally, a lengthy 
  32process usually leads to a deterioration of the operating performance of the firm as managers’ 
incentives collapse and workers are disgruntled about the possibility of losing their jobs. 
Evidence from Mexico suggests this is the case, as each additional month taken to complete the 
privatization process costs an average of 2.2 to 3.4 percent of PQ.
21  
 
Prior Restructuring Policies 
 
Government restructuring of SOEs prior to their sale is fraught with political difficulties. Direct 
costs of restructuring are quite substantial and are equivalent, on average, to about 30 percent of 
the sale price. As with other policies, restructuring programs can be defended rationally on the 
grounds that they increase revenues from the sale, or that they minimize layoffs and contribute to 
the future success of the privatized firm. As a result, there is great ambivalence about the optimal 
policy approach towards restructuring prior to privatization. Analyzing this question is not a 
straightforward proposition because restructuring measures are not undertaken randomly, but 
selectively targeted to firms that need them most.
22 To solve this problem, we use an instrumental 
variable approach to capture the true effect of restructuring measures on privatization prices.
23 
In this section, we look at six types of prior restructuring: (1) change in management; (2) 
labor retrenchment; (3) debt absorption; (4) efficiency programs; (5) investment measures; and 
(6) de-investment measures. Restructuring measures are almost certainly endogenous, and 
therefore we focus on the results provided by the instrumental variable regression.  
                                                                                                                                                             
20 An alternative hypothesis is that sectors under control of the state tend to be those with the greatest untapped 
capacity for efficiency gains. In this case the premium is explained because of a higher perceived future growth rate 
and not because of the belief that protective regulations will be maintained. 
21 This hypothesis is supported by López-de-Silanes (1997), who finds that it is “internal speed,” the length of time 
that elapses from when the first rumors of privatization arise to the time of the public announcement, and not “public 
length,” the time elapsed from the formal announcement to the conclusion of the sale, which explains the discount in 
PQ. 
22 We would expect the government to absorb debt of highly indebted SOEs, to fire workers when firms face serious 
over-employment, or to invest in new machinery when production processes are outdated. If the endogenous nature 
of these measures is not considered, we run the risk of reaching the wrong conclusions as regression coefficients 
would capture not only the effect of the restructuring measure, but also the negative effects of being in distress or 
having a bloated workforce. 
23 We apply a two-step instrumental variables approach by estimating a non-linear reduced-form equation that 
describes the probability that a particular labor restructuring policy will be implemented. The instruments used are 
classified into two groups: firm-level and macroeconomic-level determinants. The firm-level variables included the 
presence of a leading agent bank, involvement of a ministry before privatization, the political affiliation of unions, 
and sectoral dummies. The macroeconomic variables include the average GDP growth rate and the degree of 
openness in the three years prior to privatization and the legal origin of the country. None of these variables is 
statistically significant when included in the price equation. The F-statistic for the excluded instruments is 
statistically significant at 1 percent in all cases.  
  33Management shake-ups before privatization can lead to lower privatization prices if the 
loss of experienced managers leads to deteriorating performance (Bolton and Roland, 1992). On 
the other hand, removing an entrenched team can improve the operating performance of a firm as 
well as make it easier to tackle mismanagement and corruption. This is especially likely if 
management was appointed for political rather than technical reasons (Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer 
et al., 1996). The empirical evidence supports the second hypothesis, as firing the CEO leads to a 
statistically significant increase of 55 percent in the PQ.
24  
The argument against restructuring labor contracts or firing workers before privatization 
rests on the assumption that the new owner will be better suited to choose which workers to 
retain and which to dismiss, and he can therefore restructure the labor force to suit his needs at a 
lower cost than the government could. This may be particularly true if unions have significant 
power to influence the political process through elections or collective action (Freeman, 1986). 
On the other, the public sector may have a comparative advantage in bargaining with unions if it 
can convince workers that there will be social mechanisms in place to assist them. For our 
sample of Mexican privatized firms, labor retrenchment had a slight negative effect on PQ under 
the OLS regression but a significant positive impact once we account for its endogenous nature. 
Under this specification, a 10 percent reduction in the labor force is associated with a statistically 
significant 12 percent increase in PQ. This evidence should be taken with care, as recent 
investigations dealing specifically with the effects of labor retrenchment on privatization suggest 
that these programs are seldom the optimal policy (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2003).   
Classical finance theory holds that government’s absorption of SOEs’ debt should have a 
neutral effect on price because potential acquirers would simply increase their bids by the same 
amount as the decrease in debt (Donaldson and Wagle, 1995). However, it is possible to imagine 
scenarios under which debt absorption could have a positive or negative effect on net prices if 
the borrowing terms for the private buyers are different than those for the government or if debt 
absorption reduces the expected cost of financial distress for excessively leveraged companies 
(Bolton and Roland, 1992). Once we control for endogeneity, the effect of debt absorption on PQ 
becomes quantitatively and statistically insignificant.  
                                                 
24 We also investigated the effects of changing the management team independently of the CEO and find no 
significant effect. We can therefore tentatively conclude that the main benefit stems from changing the head and not 
the body of the management team.  
  34Some of the most frequent restructuring policies undertaken include investment programs 
and efficiency measures. We would expect a premium in PQ for restructured firms if the 
government is able to improve the operating performance of firms at a lower cost than the private 
sector could. However, if restructuring decisions are driven by political motivations and/or if the 
government is unable to match the know-how of private firms, the restructuring effort will be a 
waste of resources and therefore lower PQ. The latter seems to be the case in Mexico as, 
controlling for endogeneity, firms subject to efficiency measures and investment plans were sold 
for PQ’s 56 and 95 percent lower, respectively. 
If bidders value investments by the government at less than their cost, it is worth 
investigating if it may be plausible to increase PQ by cutting the flow of resources and canceling 
previously approved investments programs. This may not be straightforward, however, as de-
investment may hurt the long-term profitability of firms and lead to lower prices. Our results find 
that, on average, undertaking de-investment measures has no significant effect.  
Available empirical evidence strongly suggests that restructuring policies do not lead to 
better net prices per dollar of assets sold. We find that the optimal policy seems to be to refrain 
as much as possible from engaging in SOE restructuring. Some of the most popular measures 
such as debt absorption do not increase net prices, while others such as investment and efficiency 
programs actually reduce net prices. These results are actually quite intuitive once we realize that 
all it implies is that new owners are able to better satisfy their own goals better than politicians 
could.  
 
6. Complementary Policies of Privatization 
 
Privatization should not be looked at in isolation. Its success or failure is likely to depend on a 
set of complementary policies that are sometimes neglected. First, the outcome of a privatization 
process depends crucially on the quality and appropriateness of the contracts written, particularly 
when dealing with the provision of public services or public-private ventures. Policymakers 
should not rely on the good will of the private sector to act in the best interest of society. If the 
privatization contracts do not establish the right incentives, it should come as no surprise that 
newly privatized firms will try to use market power to increase their benefits or that concession 
holders may manipulate their accounts to extract rents from the government. Second, it is crucial 
to carefully consider the necessary deregulation or re-regulation for sectors with market power or 
  35in which government ownership represented a substantial percentage of total assets prior to 
privatization. Without adequate deregulation, firms may not restructure as planned and potential 
efficiency gains may be lost, as it is easier to extract rents form the government. On the other 
hand, without a program to re-regulate privatized firms, those with market power may use their 
ability to influence prices to exploit consumers, and those in sectors with protective regulations 
may benefit from barriers to entry and other measures originally intended to protect SOEs from 
competition. Finally, it is important to establish a set of institutions that promote good corporate 
governance and strengthen shareholder and creditor rights in order to facilitate firms’ access to 
capital and allow recently privatized firms to finance their growth without dependence on the 
State.  
 
The Type of Contract Written 
 
The type of privatization contract written is of the utmost importance to ensure that no room is 
left for opportunistic behavior at the hands of politicians or private buyers. The simplest 
contracts are straightforward sales of assets in which the government disconnects itself 
completely from the operational future of the privatized firm. Other types of contracts may lead 
to a perverse relationship between the privatized firm and the state as managers and bureaucrats 
collude to serve their interests at the expense of consumers and taxpayers.  
Most vulnerable to this sort of manipulation are the provision of services, the 
construction of infrastructure projects, and the establishment of joint ventures between private 
companies and the government. The common element in these cases is that the umbilical cord 
between the government and the firm has not been severed, leaving room for rent-seeking 
behavior. When privatized firms depend on the state for funding or need permission to undertake 
certain decisions, it is likely that the incentives to restructure will not be as strong and that 
management will instead focus its efforts on extracting rents from the government. These 
perverse incentives are fed by politicians who often aspire to transform firms into national 
champions by subsidizing them and shielding them from competition. This collusion with 
business is often rewarded directly by economic support from firms and by the political benefits 
derived from being perceived as standing up for labor and against foreign competitors. To 
minimize the potential losses from these arrangements and to ensure that privatized firms live up 
to their commitments, clear disclosure and monitoring mechanisms are needed.  
  36The importance of writing adequate contracts can be illustrated by one of the major 
instances of failure in Mexico’s privatization program, the concessions to construct and manage 
highways. As Rogozinski and Tovar (1998) explain, to encourage private sector participation in 
highways, the government included clauses in its contracts guaranteeing minimum traffic growth 
rates. If revenues fell below the guaranteed level, the private party would be entitled to claim a 
revision of the length of the concession. Moreover, under this scheme, the only variable of 
adjustment was the length of the concession. These incentives created perverse rent-seeking 
incentives for concession holders to inflate construction costs and to charge excessively high toll 
charges. With the peso devaluation of 1994, a bad situation was made much worse as lower than 
expected revenues and higher interest rates pushed many concession holders to the brink of 
bankruptcy. Banks that had supplied much of the debt were themselves hard hit and thus unable 
or unwilling to provide relief through debt restructuring (World Bank, 2003). 
The World Bank’s 2003 report on infrastructure privatization in Mexico points out four 
basic causes of the failure of road privatization. First, the program as a whole was not financially 
sound; concessions with the highest profit potential were awarded first, but the overall program 
was too extensive for each concession to be financially self-sufficient. Second, the decision to 
award concessions based on the shortest period of private ownership led to excessively high toll 
levels. The average duration of concessions was 12 years, and in two cases an award was given 
for only five years. This led to inefficiencies as several newly built toll roads were virtually 
empty while parallel public roads remained heavily congested; truck traffic, in particular, failed 
to meet forecast levels. Third, poor feasibility studies led to overgenerous contracts. The SCT did 
not have the necessary experience or resources to carry out appropriate cost and demand 
forecasts for such an extensive program and, in particular, it seems to have substantially 
underestimated the demand elasticity of toll roads. Finally, underbidding and overvaluation of 
contractor contributions were widespread. Contractors overvalued their contributions, especially 
once financial problems emerged, because they could then press for extensions on the 
concession.  
The policy lesson is clear: contracts must be designed to take into account moral hazard 
incentives and the asymmetries of information between the government and the private sector. 
The design of the contracts should be based on economic efficiency considerations rather than 





An appropriate regulatory framework after privatization is a key component of the success or 
failure of the program. A common element across many failed examples of privatization is 
inadequate deregulation, which may lead to sub-optimal levels of competition and allows 
producers to keep the gains from privatization without sharing them with consumers.
25 
Deregulation is particularly important in sectors where the state owned most of the assets prior to 
privatization, as they tend to be protected by a web of regulations originally instituted to cut the 
losses of state-owned firms and reduce fiscal deficits. Without a thorough review of these 
regulations, privatized firms will be artificially shielded from competition and able to make 
extraordinary gains at the cost of consumers.  
Deregulation complements privatization in two ways. First, product market competition 
provides a tool for weeding out the least efficient firms. This process may take too long—or not 
work at all—if regulation inhibits new entry or makes exit costly. Second, deregulation may also 
complement privatization by raising the cost of political intervention. Whereas an inefficient 
monopoly can squander its rents without endangering its existence, an inefficient firm in a 
competitive industry would have to receive a subsidy to stay afloat.  
Figure 4 shows the frequency and composition of deregulation measures taken in Mexico 
prior to privatization during the period from 1983 to 1992. These include price and quantity 
deregulation, simplified entry and exit barriers, lower restrictions on foreign direct investment 
and ownership, increased international competition and the elimination or reduction of subsidies. 
During the De la Madrid administration, 87 privatization contracts were carried out, with trade 
liberalization and changes in specific regulatory schemes as the most popular measures. During 
the Salinas administration, 134 privatization contracts were signed and deregulation was 
undertaken much more aggressively. In particular, price and quantity quotas were disbanded and 
entry barriers were lowered, both directly and by granting a more prominent role to foreign direct 
investment. Although it is clear that the Salinas administration engaged in deregulation with 
                                                 
25 Megginson and Netter (2001); Boubakri and Cosset (1998). 
  38greater alacrity than the previous administration, privatization coupled with deregulation played 
a key role throughout the period.  
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The figure shows the main groups of deregulation actions taken prior to privatization for a sub-sample of 
221 privatization contracts between 1983 and 1992. Not every privatization contract underwent some form 
of deregulation while others underwent several. 87 privatization contracts were carried out during the first 
period (1983-1988) and 134 during the second period (1989-1992). The exact definition of each 
restructuring group can be found in the Appendix.  
Source: Data collected by the authors from the original privatization sales and prospectuses from the 




Regulation should be carefully revised in conjunction with privatization for firms in industries 
characterized as natural monopolies or in oligopolistic markets. The reasoning behind the first 
case is that firms with market power may have ample opportunities to exploit consumers and that 
the institutions necessary to supervise them are either non-existent or do not have the necessary 
experience to do the job appropriately. While firms with market power are in public hands, it is 
likely that the profit-maximizing incentive was held in check as the government prioritized other 
goals such as providing subsidized services to certain sectors or maximizing employment. Once 
firms are handed over to the private sector, however, it is likely that the new owners will use 
whatever means they have at their disposal to increase profits. It is therefore necessary to 
  39complement privatization with adequate re-regulation and with the creation of institutions that 
ensure fair competition and a level playing field to all participants.  
A clear example of the perils of not re-regulating privatized SOEs appropriately is that of 
the Mexican banking industry. During the years under state management, banks functioned as an 
annex to the Treasury and served mainly as a tool for financing state deficits and handing out 
favors to politically influential sectors. As a result, banks did not develop the necessary 
experience in valuing the risks associated with particular loans or the skills needed to value 
collateral. Moreover, when banks were privatized there was no supervisory mechanism in place 
to ensure that bank loans to related parties were in the best interests of the bank or that reserves 
were proportional to the riskiness of the loans undertaken. The combination of these two 
shortcomings proved devastating for the banks’ future and for the thousands of shareholders who 
purchased minority stakes in them.  
  The changes made in the regulatory framework of the banking industry were structured 
around three main objectives: First, they aimed to decrease the role of the government in 
determining the allocation of bank loans; second, they tried to create a new market structure for 
financial services as a whole; and third, they attempted to curtail barriers to entry. Unfortunately, 
the reforms carried out to achieve these objectives were executed in a piecemeal fashion and not 
within the context of a comprehensive plan to provide the banking industry with adequate 
regulation. In the end, the greater flexibility granted to private banks allowed them to engage in 
risky behavior and to extract benefits from consumers and the government without providing 
incentives for banks to reform and become more efficient.  
Following privatization, lending increased rapidly and was accompanied by 
improvements in bank profitability. The average bank increased its operating margin by almost 
two percentage points to 10.85 percent, and profit margins increased from 5.37 to 6.36 percent 
(see Figure 5). Interest margins, however, remained steady at about 7 percent despite the fact that 
nominal interest rates fell from 80 to only 35 percent.
26   
                                                 
26 For this section, we consider the period “before privatization” as the time elapsed from the beginning of 1989 to 
the time of privatization of each bank; “after privatization” corresponds to the period from the time banks were 
privatized until the end of 1992, or for the longest period for which we have data. This division biases our findings 
against finding dramatic improvements in bank performance as this had been increasing since 1986. First because of 
a partial flotation of bank shares through the Mexican stock market and, second because of the deregulation 
measures adopted between 1987 and 1988. For example, although the ratio of financial margin to financial revenue 
increased almost 6 percentage points between 1988 and 1994, it increased a further 12 percentage points between 
  40Figure 5. 
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This figure shows mean performance indicators before and after privatization for the cross section of banks 
privatized in Mexico. “Financial margin / Financial revenue” is the financial margin to financial revenue 
ratio; “Interest margin” is the financial margin divided by the sum of loans portfolio plus securities 
portfolio; “Profit margin” is the period net income to the period total revenue ratio; “Operating margin” is 
the period operating income to the period total revenue ratio; “Operating income” is the real annual growth 
rate in the operating income. Before privatization refers to the period between January 1989 and the month 
of privatization of each bank while after privatization is the period ranging from the month of privatization 
to the end of 1992, or for the largest period for which information is available. The banks included in the 
sample are: Atlántico, Banpaís, Banamex, Banco del Centro, Bancomer, Bancrecer, Banco Oriente, 
Banoro, Banorte, B.C.H., Cremi, Confia, Comermex, Internacional, Mercantil, Serfín, Somex, and Promex.  
Source: López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (1995). 
 
  There are two hypotheses that can be used to explain the higher profitability of privatized 
banks without resorting to charges of collusion and market power: the employee-wealth transfer 
hypothesis and the reduced-agency cost hypothesis. The former argues that wealth is transferred 
to investors by laying off workers and reducing the wages of remaining employees (Shleifer and 
Summers, 1988), while the latter argues that proper incentives reduce agency costs and lead to 
higher profitability.  
  Figure 6 shows that the average annual change in employment after privatization is -1.64 
percent, which would seem to lend credit to the employee-wealth transfer hypothesis. However, 
the real annual growth rate of personnel expenses per employee more than doubled in the period 
                                                                                                                                                             
1987 and 1989. For a detailed analysis of bank performance during this period see López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa 
(1995). 
  41following privatization, jumping from 14.9 to 32.5 percent.
27  When put together, these two 
pieces of evidence show that labor costs not only did not decrease, but have in fact increased 
significantly following privatization. The employee-wealth transfer hypothesis therefore cannot 
explain the increased operating performance of banks.  
 
Figure 6. 
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This figure shows mean performance indicators before and after privatization for the cross section of Mexican 
privatized banks. “Growth in the number of employees” is the annual percentage increase in the number of 
employees; “Growth in personnel expenses per employee” is the real annual growth in the monthly personnel 
expense per employee; “Growth in loan portfolio” is the real growth rate in the loan portfolio; “Growth in 
securities portfolio” is the real growth rate in the securities portfolio. “Before privatization” refers to the period 
between January 1989 and the month of privatization of each bank, while “after privatization” is the period 
ranging from the month of privatization to the end of 1992, or for the longest period for which information is 
available. The banks included in the sample are: Atlántico, Banpaís, Banamex, Banco del Centro, Bancomer, 
Bancrecer, Banco Oriente, Banoro, Banorte, B.C.H., Cremi, Confia, Comermex, Internacional, Mercantil, 
Serfín, Somex, and Promex.  
Source: López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (1995). 
 
  
  In terms of the Reduced-Agency Costs hypothesis, there are two elements that point 
towards possible savings. The first concerns banking operations as such. Under government 
ownership, banks had deviated from their main lending activity and entered the securities 
market, possibly in reaction to increased competition from brokerage houses. This deviation 
reflected management or political objectives, such as size or growth, which are common for 
                                                 
27 The most likely explanation for this increase in personnel expenses despite the reduction in employment is that 
wages increased as private financial institutions competed for talented employees. This conjecture is reinforced by 
the fact that the cuts in employment show a higher concentration in unskilled labor. 
  42SOEs all over the world.  After privatization, the growth rate of the loan portfolio increased from 
35.08 percent to 51.97 percent, while the securities portfolio decreased at an annual rate of 2.04 
percent (see Figure 6). Given that the financial margin on loans ranged from 3 to 15 percent, 
while that of securities was only about 1 to 3 percent (López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa, 1995), it 
is tempting to argue that privatization reduced the agency problem because resources were 
channeled towards lending and not towards other objectives. A second source of reduced-agency 
costs can be found in the ownership structure that emerged after privatization. Most bank 
managers were also shareholders, which helps increase the incentives to maximize shareholder 
value. In addition, although management had seats on the board of directors, the board was 
controlled by outsiders, a management structure that is more likely to allow the board of 
directors to act as an effective mechanism of corporate governance (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
  These two pieces of supporting evidence notwithstanding, the banking crisis of the mid-
1990s and the role that related lending played in bringing about the collapse of the banking 
system seriously undermine the idea that reduced-agency costs can explain the increase in 
profitability experienced by privatized banks. The conclusion we are left with is therefore that 
inadequate competition allowed banks to collude and increase their profitability without really 
restructuring.  
  In terms of failed supervision, the government turned a blind eye to overdue loans. The 
supervisory system was not modernized, and the government did not require banks to increase 
their reserves or to tie them to the underlying riskiness of the loans. Meanwhile, banks continued 
to pay high dividends and reserves were progressively de-capitalized, leaving the whole system 
vulnerable to collapse. Signs of stress in the financial sector first appeared in 1993 as the 
economy slipped into a recession and, by July 1994, most financial institutions were 
experiencing serious difficulties.  
  As the financial crisis evolved, the government took over financially distressed banks 
with the goal of restructuring them and finding a buyer for them in better times. Once the dust 
settled, however, only three out of eighteen commercial banks remained independent, and none 
escaped unscathed. As of the year 2000, seven banks were under government management, five 
had been acquired by foreign financial institutions, and three had been acquired by domestic 
financial institutions. 
  43  Interestingly, many, if not most, of the defaulted loans that led to the collapse of the 
banking industry were related loans, or loans granted to directors of the bank or companies in the 
same industrial conglomerate as others owned by bank directors. Many economists have argued 
that related lending is beneficial to banks, as it allows them to better assess the risks related to 
particular projects and to monitor the compliance of debtors. If this is true, banks may be able to 
get higher ex-post returns from preferential loans granted to related parties than from arm’s-
length transactions at full rates. In the Mexican case, however, there is evidence that related 
lending was used by controlling shareholders to loot banks.  
There are four basic results that, when put together, overwhelmingly support the looting 
view of related lending. First, the borrowing terms offered to related parties were substantially 
better than those available to unrelated ones (see Figure 7). Controlling for observable financial 
characteristics, the interest rate for fixed-rate related loans in pesos was a mean of 6.88 
percentage points lower than that of unrelated loans. The smallest difference is 2.25 percent for 
floating rate dollar-denominated loans, still a significant margin and, like all the others, 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Moreover, loans to related parties involved 
collateral or personal guarantees less often than unrelated loans, and when they did so it was for 
a lower amount. Finally, the maturity of related loans was an average of 3 months longer and the 
grace period 7 months longer than that of unrelated loans. These facts clearly establish that 
related loans were given preferential treatment over unrelated ones.  
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This table shows the main characteristics of related vs. unrelated loans in Mexico for a random 
sample of loans between 1995 and 1999. Panel A shows the mean change in real interest rates for 
the sample of related versus unrelated loans. Panel B shows the mean (i) difference of the 
percentage of loans with collateral; (ii) percentage points difference in the collateral to value of the 
loan ratio; (iii) difference in the percentage of loans backed up with personal guarantees. Panel C 
shows the mean difference in: (i) months to maturity of the loan; and (ii) difference in months of 
grace granted to the loans. For a description of the sample and definitions of all variables refer to 
the Appendix.  
Source: La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2003).  
a Significant at 1 percent; 
b Significant 
at 5 percent; 
c Significant at 10 percent. 
 
 
  45The second point is that the default rate on related loans was 70 percent versus only 39 
percent for unrelated parties and recovery rates were 19 to 40 cents per dollar lower for related 
borrowers than for unrelated ones (see Figure 8). This clearly undermines the idea that 
preferential loans can be justified by higher ex-post returns.  
 
Figure 8. 
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This table shows the difference in default rates, the rate of recovery of bad loans and the 
overall rate of recovery between related and unrelated loans for a random sample of 300 
loans during the period 1995-1999.  
Source: La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Zamarripa (2003). 
 
Third, related lending represented about 20 percent all loans outstanding, the limit 
established by law. Moreover, as the economy slipped into recession, the fraction of related 
lending doubled for banks that subsequently went bankrupt, while it increased only slightly for 
the banks that survived. This suggests that when bankers thought they might lose their 
investment they stepped up the rate of looting in order to extract as much value as possible while 
they still controlled the bank, and it is consistent with what a theoretical model of looting would 
predict.  
Finally, and most interestingly, the worst-performing loans were those made to persons or 
companies closest to the controllers of the banks. In most cases, a dollar lent to a firm owned by 
the bank’s owners turned out to be a dollar lost.  
The evidence provided above clearly shows that related lending had a negative effect on 
the banking sector in Mexico. Loans to related parties were not granted because it was easier to 
  46supervise compliance or because related parties were more suitable candidate. Instead, there is 
clear evidence that related loans were used to divert funds away from banks and to exploit 
minority shareholders. Even so, bank owners emerged from the crisis relatively unscathed; after 
“tunneling” money out of their bank, they lost control of the bank but not their industrial assets. 
Although related lending explains a significant part of the problem in financial 
institutions, it cannot be blamed completely for the current malaise of the banking sector. The 
other aspect of lending is collecting, and banks need to have effective collecting mechanisms in 
place. Effective corporate governance through creditor protection has recently proven to be a key 
component of the development of financial systems around the world. As we will see in the next 
section, the problems brought on by related lending were exacerbated and in part instigated by 
deficient shareholder and creditor rights.  
 
7.  Privatization and Corporate Governance 
 
The development and appropriate functioning of stock and credit markets needs a solid 
regulatory framework that promotes investor protection and disclosure. Recent research shows a 
strong link between firms’ access to capital and efficiently enforced laws, and in countries where 
large numbers of firms have been privatized and deregulation has increased competition and 
lowered trade barriers, there is an urgent need for institutions that can efficiently channel 
resources to the private sector.
28 The old laws and institutions that might have been efficient in 
covering the needs of state-owned enterprises will probably not suffice for the requirements of 
private enterprises and privatized firms. This section focuses on the role of shareholder rights 
and creditor rights as important determinants of the success of stock markets and credit 
institutions.  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that the size of capital markets is determined only by 
the cash flows that accrue to investors; roughly speaking, this implies that the size of capital 
markets should be proportional to GNP. To explain the large discrepancies in the size of 
financial markets across countries with similar GNP, however, we need to recognize that 
securities are more than the cash flows they represent. They entitle investors to exercise certain 
rights and to exercise control over management through the voting process. Similarly, debt not 
                                                 
28 See La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999); La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000a, 
2000b, 2002); La Porta, López-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002). 
  47only entitles creditors to receive interest payments, but also to regain their collateral in the event 
of bankruptcy. 
Countries differ enormously in the extent to which they afford legal protection to 
investors. Not only does a shareholder in Mexico have a very different set of rights from one in 
the United Kingdom or the United States, but his recourse to redress is also likely to be 
significantly weaker. The legal theory (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 
and 1998) predicts larger capital markets in countries where agency costs are reined in by the law 
and the institutions built to support their enforcement. The evidence presented in these studies 
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This table shows the number of firms listed in the Mexican stock exchange and their market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP. Sources: (i) Market capitalization / GDP: Standard and Poor’s Emerging Market Database (and 
Emerging Stock Markets Factbook); (ii) Number of listed companies: For 1985 and 1988 the Source is Banco de 
México and Indicadores Bursátiles (BMV, 1985-1992); for 1990 to 2001 the source is the World Federation of 
Exchanges. 
 
Figure 9 shows market capitalization as a percentage of GDP and the number of listed 
firms in the Mexican stock exchange. Not surprisingly, the Mexican market has a low 
capitalization by international standards. The stock market did, however, enjoy a significant 
  48boom during the Salinas administration, as many privatized firms were subsequently listed and 
those that already were increased their capitalization considerably. Market capitalization 
increased from slightly over 5 percent in 1988 to almost 45 percent in only 6 years. Following 
the 1994-1995 crisis, capitalization plunged to 25 percent and has dropped further since. 
Moreover, the number of listed firms itself is declining, which suggests that firms are either 
going bankrupt or are being taken private. In either case, it is a clear sign that corporate 
governance structures are not functioning efficiently.  
There have been some recent attempts to strengthen shareholder rights in Mexico. Most 
notably, the 1997 and 2001 securities acts moved from a merit to a disclosure system of 
regulation. They also established requirements for a minimum number of independent directors 
on boards of listed companies and mandated the creation of an independent audit committee. A 
forthcoming securities act attempts to expand protection further by making the economic group 
the subject of regulation, establishing the duty of loyalty and care for directors, improving 
disclosure requirements, improving the enforcement powers of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and establishing a special committee to monitor conflicts of interest and related-
party transactions. Furthermore, the new securities act seeks to limit the issuing of non-voting 
shares and expand the rights of minority shareholders to obtain information about the firm, 
convene shareholder meetings, designate comptrollers and even challenge unfair actions through 
the judicial system. Although these reforms are expected to have a significant effect, their scope 
is inherently limited, as they apply only to listed companies. The next step will be to expand 
some of these best practices to a broader set of firms.  
Another source of finance for privatized firms and other businesses is bank lending. 
However if financing for privatized SOEs is expected to come from privatized banks—or from 
any other private credit institution—then creditor rights, embedded in bankruptcy laws and the 
efficiency of courts, must be strengthened and streamlined.  
Without proper bankruptcy procedures that allow for the expedient recovery of assets, 
financial institutions will be reluctant to lend and may end up failing to satisfy the financial 
needs of the private sector. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) empirically 
confirmed the existence of a strong link between efficient creditor rights and an efficient 
judiciary with deeper debt markets. In a more recent paper, Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes 
and Shleifer (2003) studied the costs, in both time and money, involved in collecting a bounced 
  49check or evicting a tenant in 109 countries. Their results show that Mexico ranks among the 
worst countries; this suggests that if there are considerable difficulties in using the court system 
for simple procedures, foreclosing on defaulted loans would prove even more cumbersome. The 
lesson is clear: if banks are to function appropriately, they must have mechanisms in place to 
recover the costs of loans in the case of default. Otherwise, the possibility of having a large 
number of irrecoverable loans default will drive up the interest rates for all projects, stifling 
growth and aggravating adverse selection problems.  
  There are two types of reforms that may be key to building stronger and sounder financial 
institutions. First, potential conflicts of interest in boards of directors of banks must be reduced. 
These boards have allowed large-scale unprofitable related lending to occur, which has increased 
the fragility of the banks and of the overall financial system. Corporate governance reform must 
be designed to prevent interested directors from voting on approving related transactions that do 
not benefit the institution as a whole. Tougher limits on related loans, disclosure of related 
credits, and laws that effectively punish directors who vote in favor of unprofitable transactions 
should be among the first group of reforms. Second, in the event that a borrower defaults on its 
loans, financial institutions need to be able to exercise their rights to collect their debts.  An 
essential condition for improved creditor protection is strengthening bankruptcy laws and   
increasing efficiency in the implementation of these rights.  
    
8. Conclusion 
 
Empirical evidence shows that the Mexican government was effective in improving its fiscal 
discipline, increasing the efficient allocation of resources and restructuring inefficient SOEs. 
Success, however, has not been absolute. Although the privatization process was drastic and far-
reaching, public utilities and firms in the energy sector remain in State possession. Moreover, 
there have been important failures in the Mexican privatization process, such as banks and 
highways. 
  The Mexican experience provides valuable insights into what to do and what not to do 
regarding large-scale privatization programs. Mexico’s program should be considered a success, 
as the performance of firms increase dramatically according to all performance measures and both 
the government and consumers are better off as a result. Nevertheless, particular care should be 
  50taken to provide appropriate regulation of oligopolistic sectors or those that have spent a 
considerable time under the control of the State.  
  This study provides three useful lessons that any privatization program should heed in 
order to maximize the probability of success. First, the privatization process must be carefully 
designed. Special requirements such as a ban on Foreign Direct Investment or cash-only 
payments lead to substantial price discounts for firms sold. Simplicity and transparency, on the 
other hand, increase prices because they expedite the whole process and increase the number of 
bidders. Speed is important because the operational efficiency of SOEs tends to atrophy once 
rumors of divestiture arise. The ability to draw on a wide pool of bidders is crucial in order to 
maximize the price received for privatized firms and therefore to obtain the most social benefit 
from the program. Privatization of services and infrastructure provides a valuable opportunity to 
enhance social welfare, but contracts must be carefully designed. Special attention is needed to 
ensure that the incentives of future owners are aligned with those of the government.  
  Second, restructuring firms prior to privatization is usually counterproductive in raising 
net sale prices. Restructuring programs are usually politically motivated and cost more than the 
value they add to companies; this is in addition to the fact that they lengthen the privatization 
process and therefore increase the costs related to the sale. Although the evidence from Mexico 
shows that labor retrenchment paid off, this is probably due to the abnormally bloated workforce 
of most Mexican SOEs. Nonetheless, labor retrenchment is fraught with difficulties because the 
most politically palatable option, voluntary retirement programs, is plagued by adverse selection 
problems. Under these schemes, the most experienced and productive workers tend to leave and 
the least productive stay. The government is thus left with a steep bill from severance payments 
and bidders are left with a lower-quality workforce that may not possess the skills necessary to 
run the firm successfully.  
  Third, re-regulation of sectors with market power, de-regulation of industries previously 
protected by the government and efficient corporate governance institutions are important 
complementary measures to privatization. There is mounting evidence of the importance of good 
corporate governance institutions in ensuring positive results from privatization and avoiding 
debacles similar to the one suffered by the Mexican banking industry due to related lending. The 
need for better regulation and corporate governance is not an argument for slower privatization, 
but it does point to the need for studying similar privatization programs in order to anticipate the 
  51regulatory framework and best practices codes needed for firms to have a smooth transition into 
the private sector.  
  Privatization and deregulation have allowed the Mexican government to withdraw from 
virtually all commercial and industrial activities and to concentrate on providing a stable 
economic environment. The proceeds from privatization helped deal with a crushing debt burden 
and allowed the government to invest in education and poverty alleviation. The evidence 
provided in this paper leaves but one conclusion: The overall effect of privatization has been 
positive for Mexico. 
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  56Appendix 
 
This Appendix describes all variables used to compute the results presented in the paper. It 
contains three panels, each based on a different section of the paper. The first panel describes the 
restructuring actions undertaken for a cross section of 221 privatized SOEs in the period 1983-
1992. We gathered this data from the original privatization sales and prospectuses from the 
Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP). The second panel corresponds to the 
quantitative variables collected for a cross section of 170 non-financial firms privatized in 
Mexico during the period 1983-1992 and used to measure the performance of privatized firms. 
We gather the pre-privatization data from the original privatization sales and prospectuses from 
the Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit (SHCP). For each firm, we compute the pre-
privatization value of each variable or ratio by averaging its value in the four years that preceded 
the privatization of the firm. The post-privatization data come from the 1994 Economic Census 
from the Mexican National Statistics Institute (INEGI) and refers to 1993 data for each firm. 
When necessary, industry adjustments are made to various variables and ratios with the use of 
(1) financial data of publicly traded firms in the Mexican stock market, (2) INEGI’s Monthly 
Survey of Industry, and (3) the Producer Price Index at the sector level. The third panel defines 
the loan characteristic variables used in our related lending section. Regulation in 1995 required 
banks to submit a list of the three hundred largest loans as well as their size and detailed 
information about the borrowers. Our sources are the SAM-300 database (largest 300 loans for 
each bank), SENICREB database (complete list of loans made by each of the privatized banks), 
and banks individual databases as reported to the Mexican Banking Commission. 
 
Variable Definitions 
  Panel A: Restructuring Actions 
Management  These actions include changes of the CEO and in the next level of the management team, as well 
as the creation or changes in the board of directors in the two years prior to privatization. 
Labor  These actions include pre-privatization labor reductions of union or non-union workers with 
their related severance payment costs, as well as varying forms of labor contract restructuring, 
plans for worker ownership of shares, cancellation of collective contracts in some subsidiaries or 
for the whole company, and unions unification under the same contract. 
Debt absorption   The actions include the government’s engagement in: (i) partial or total debt absorptions of 
outsiders’ debt (that was owed to private companies or private banks); (ii) cross liabilities and 
(iii) the absorption of the company’s past-due fiscal liabilities or taxes.  
Efficiency Programs  Under this category are grouped all of those detected actions which increased the management 
responsibility, increased the flexibility of investment policies, or referred to the installation of 
programs with defined performance targets and internal restructuring of operations. 
Investment  Programs  These actions involves only detectable programs of rehabilitation and maintenance plans, 
agreements of financial restructuring tied to inflow of resources for operation improvements, and 
temporary re-openings of the plant.  
These  actions include partial or total shutdown of operation, stopping of major investment 
programs, declarations of emergency-only expenditure taking place, and discontinuation of all 
government funding. 
De-investment measures 
Legal measures  This group of actions involves the solution or clarification of legal disputes, the reorganization 
and consolidation of all legal information and demands against the company, renewal or creation 
of necessary operation concessions and permits, and changes in the legal incorporation or in 
company’s bylaws. Under this category are also considered negotiations with other shareholders 
regarding either their “preference status” in the case of sale, or their agreement to sell their 
shares to the new buyer or to put them in the government’s hands for privatization of a larger 
package. 
Assets Restructure  The actions include the government’s prior to sale engagement in: (i) clarification or sometimes 
documentation of fixed assets ownership, especially in the cases of broken-up corporations, (ii) 
patent registrations and changes in assets classification mechanisms, (iii) break-ups or splits of 
the SOE for its sale and (iv) spin-offs of specific assets. 
 
These measures reflect deregulation actions undertaken by the government tied to privatization. 
The range of actions includes price and quantity deregulations, foreign direct investment and 
ownership restrictions, international trade quotas or tariffs, entry or exit barriers for domestic or 
international competitors, changes in the regulation scheme of the company or the industry, and 
elimination or reduction of subsidies. 
Deregulation 
  Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
Privatization Q  The value of the Government’s Net Privatization Price (GNPP) adjusted by the fraction of shares 
sold plus total liabilities at the time of privatization, divided by total assets of the company at the 
time of privatization. GNPP is calculated as follows:  
* GNPP B P R GC Adj ′ =− − −  
where (B') is the present value of the nominal price of sale as registered in the sale contract which 
is adjusted in the following ways: (a) subtraction of the cost of the restructuring measures (P*R) 
undertaken by the government prior to the sale; (b) subtraction of the costs of the  “Government 
Commitments” and the  “Special Clauses” promised by the government at the time of the sale 
(GC), matching them with the actual bills paid later on; and (c) addition/subtraction of the 
adjustments made to the sale contract (Adj), which includes reimbursements on both sides when 
the financial statements differ from the ones given to the bidders before the sale. 
 
Operating income/sales  The ratio of operating income to sales. Operating income is equal to sales minus operating 
expenses, minus cost of sales, and minus depreciation. Sales are equal to the total value of 
products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts. 
Operating income/PPE   The ratio of operating income to property, plant, and equipment (PPE). Operating income is equal 
to sales minus operating expenses, minus cost of sales, and minus depreciation. Property, plant, 
and equipment is equal to the value of a company’s fixed assets adjusted for inflation. 
Net income/ sales  The ratio of net income to sales. Net income is equal to operating income minus interest expenses 
and net taxes paid, as well as the cost of any extraordinary items. Sales are equal to the total value 
of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts. 
Net income/ PPE  The ratio of net income to property, plant, and equipment (PPE). Net income is equal to operating 
income minus interest expenses and net taxes paid, as well as the cost of any extraordinary items. 
Property, plant, and equipment is equal to the value of a company’s fixed assets adjusted for 
inflation. 
Cost per unit  The ratio of cost of sales to net sales. Cost of sales is equal to the direct expense involved in the 
production of a good (or provision of a service). This includes raw material expenditure plus total 
compensation paid to blue-collar workers. Sales are equal to the total value of products and 
services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts. 
Log (sales/PPE)  The log of the ratio of sales to property, plant, and equipment (PPE). Sales are equal to the total 
value of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and 
discounts. Property, plant, and equipment are equal to the value of a company’s fixed assets 
adjusted for inflation. 
Log (sales/employees)  The log of the ratio of sales to total number of employees. Sales are equal to the total value of 
products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts. 
Employees correspond to the total number of workers (paid and unpaid) who depend directly on 
the company. 
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Log (Total Employment)  The log of the total number of employees. Employees correspond to the total number of workers 
(paid and unpaid) who depend directly on the company. They receive, in general, either salary or 
wage payments on a regular schedule and work at least fifteen hours a week. A minimal number 
of these workers do not receive a regular salary. This number includes all workers on strike, as 
well as workers who still report to officials of the company despite different work locations, and 




The log of the total number of white-collar workers. White-collar workers perform skilled labor 
and administrative tasks for modest to high salaries. They are individuals involved in sales, 
administration, and management. 
Log (blue-collar workers)  The log of the total number of blue-collar workers. Blue-collar workers perform un- or semi-
skilled labor for modest to low wages. They perform tasks directly related to the (mass) 
production process or menial services. Typically, they are factory line or maintenance workers. 
Investment/sales  The ratio of investment to sales. Investment is equal to the value of expenditure to acquire 
property, equipment, and other capital assets that produce revenue. Sales are equal to the total 
value of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and 
discounts. The total number of workers (paid and unpaid) who depend directly on the companies. 
Investment/PPE  The ratio of investment to PPE. Investment is equal to the value of expenditure to acquire 
property, equipment, and other capital assets that produce revenue. Property, plant, and 
equipment are equal to the value of a company’s fixed assets adjusted for inflation. 
Log (sales)  The log of sales. Sales are equal to the total value of products and services sold, nationally and 
internationally, minus sales returns and discounts. 
Index of real prices 
(Paasche) 
The Paasche price index is the ratio (expressed as a percentage) of the total value in the given 
year of the quantity of each commodity produced in the given year to what would have been the 
total value of these quantities in the base year. In order to isolate changes in relative prices, for 
each firm and for each of the firm’s line of business, we found an appropriate control group 
among the 61 sectors that have official. Producer Price Index statistics and report the post-
privatization behavior of the firm-level price index relative to its control group. 
Net taxes/sales  The ratio of net taxes to sales. Net taxes are equal to corporate income taxes paid net of direct 
subsidies received during the fiscal year. Sales are equal to the total value of products and 
services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and discounts. 
Index of total employment  For each firm, the index takes value of 100 for the pre-privatization period. The 1993 value is 
computed by augmenting the pre-privatization value by the difference between the cumulative 
growth rate of employment of the firm and the cumulative growth rate of employment of the 
control group in the post-privatization period relative to the average employment in the four years 
that preceded privatization. Industry control groups are given by three-digit S.I.C. sectors for all 
manufacturing firms and an index of economy wide total employment for firms in the mining and 
the service sectors. A similar procedure is used for the calculation of the index of blue-collar 
workers and the index of white-collar workers. 
Index of real wages per 
worker 
For each firm, the index takes the value of 100 for the pre-privatization period. Real average 
wages paid per worker in each firm. The Consumer Price Index was used as a deflator to calculate 
real wages.  
Index of real wages per 
blue-collar worker 
For each firm, the index takes the value of 100 for the pre-privatization period. Real average 
wages paid per blue-collar worker in each firm. The Consumer Price Index was used as a deflator 
to calculate real wages.  
Index of real wages per 
white-collar worker 
For each firm, the index takes the value of 100 for the pre-privatization period. Real average 
wages paid per white -collar worker in each firm. The Consumer Price Index was used as a 
deflator to calculate real wages. 
Index of industry-adjusted 
real wages per worker 
 
For each firm, the index takes the value of 100 for the pre-privatization period. The 1993 value is 
computed by augmenting the pre-privatization value by the difference between the cumulative 
growth rate of real wages per worker of the firm and the cumulative growth rate of real wages per 
worker of the control group in the post-privatization period relative to the average real wage per 
worker in the four years that preceded privatization. Industry control groups are given by three-
digit S.I.C. sectors for all manufacturing firms and an index of economy wide real wages per 
worker for firms in the mining and the service sectors. A similar procedure is used for the 
calculation of the index of industry-adjusted real wages per blue-collar and the index of industry-
adjusted real wages per white-collar worker. 
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Index of industry-adjusted 
real wages per blue-collar 
worker 
For each firm, the index takes the value of 100 for the pre-privatization period. The 1993 value is 
computed by augmenting the pre-privatization value by the difference between the cumulative 
growth rate of real wages per blue-collar worker of the firm and the cumulative growth rate of 
real wages per blue-collar worker of the control group in the post-privatization period relative to 
the average real wage per blue-collar worker in the four years that preceded privatization. 
Industry control groups are given by three-digit S.I.C. sectors for all manufacturing firms and an 
index of economy wide real wages per blue-collar worker for firms in the mining and the service 
sectors. 
Index of industry-adjusted 
real wages per white-
collar worker 
For each firm, the index takes the value of 100 for the pre-privatization period. The 1993 value is 
computed by augmenting the pre-privatization value by the difference between the cumulative 
growth rate of real wages per white-collar worker of the firm and the cumulative growth rate of 
real wages per white-collar worker of the control group in the post-privatization period relative to 
the average real wage per white-collar worker in the four years that preceded privatization. 
Industry control groups are given by three-digit S.I.C. sectors for all manufacturing firms and an 
index of economy wide real wages per white-collar worker for firms in the mining and the service 
sectors 
 
Total wages/sales  The ratio of the total wages paid by the firm to the sales of the firm. Total wages is equal to the 
total wage bill paid by the firm to blue- and white-collar employees. Sales are equal to the total 
value of products and services sold, nationally and internationally, minus sales returns and 
discounts. 
  Panel C: Loan Characteristics 














+ ∑ , 
where i is the reference interest rate assigned to the loan, s is the spread above the interest rate 
and π the inflation rate. For loans in Mexican pesos the inflation rate was calculated using the 
Producer Price Index (INPP) excluding oil products. For loans in US dollars and other foreign 
currencies the inflation rate was calculated using the US Producer Price Index (PPI) of finished 
products.  
Collateral   Variable that takes a value equal to one if the loan is backed by collateral; and zero otherwise. 
Definitions from collateral include physical tangible assets, financial documents (e.g., title 
documents, securities, etc.), intangibles, and business proceeds pledged by the borrower to ensure 
repayment on the loan. Collateral does not include personal guarantees such as obligations backed 
only by the signature of the borrower or the submission of wealth statements from guarantors to 
the bank—a usual practice in Mexico. 
Collateral value / loan 
value 
The ratio of collateral value to loan value when the loan was first granted.  
Personal guarantees   Variable that takes a value equal to one if the loan is secured by a personal guarantee; and zero 
otherwise. A personal guarantee is defined as the obligation of repayment by a letter of 
compromise. Usually, the debtor must submit wealth statements from a guarantor who is willing 
to backs his loan. 
Maturity  The number of months to maturity of the loan starting from the moment in which the loan was 
granted.  
Grace period  The number of months beyond maturity given to a debtor in order to repay the balance due. A 
grace period is granted to a debtor on an individual basis. A loan may have no grace period at all 
but, if granted, the grace period may vary according to the loan type and terms established in the 
loan contract. 
Loan in domestic 
currency  
Variable that takes a value equal to one if the loan is denominated in Mexican pesos or in 
Mexican inflation-adjusted currency units UDIs (Unidad de Inversión) and zero otherwise.  
Loan with fixed interest-
rate  
Variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the loan pays a fixed interest rate and 0 otherwise. A fixed 
interest rate loan pays an annual percentage rate on a fixed rate for during the duration of the loan. 
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